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Abstract 
Around the world, in developed and developing countries, the way electricity is 
generated and distributed is being subject to change. Either because of environment 
reasons (EU), ageing grids (USA), or booming development (China), this is now subject 
to several transformations; some of them taking place on a big scale, others taking the 
form of pilot projects. One point is consensual, i.e., these are transformations that span 
through the activities of several actors across the electricity value chain, and are 
transformations that involve huge investment sums. Given this, some coordination 
mechanisms are needed so that stakeholders (such as Distribution System Operators) 
don’t fall in holdup situations; besides that, and going straight to the heart of our 
dissertation, these players shall have the incentives to make the changes in the direction 
of a Smart Grid (an automated electric grid that promises more intelligence on the way 
electricity is generated, transported, and consumed) and not to continue their operations 
keeping the status quo. 
In this work, we look at the European Union (EU) and ask if current policies and 
regulation provide the environment needed for Smart Grid implementation; we go 
through the EU Energy Policy, governments support, and regulation, and gouge the 
initiatives taken so far. These incentives, mainly economic, shall last for long time, as 
the transformations foreseen take several years (if not decades) to be implemented; thus 
as many authors, we think these incentives shall be given in the context of regulation. 
We also take in account that electricity industry is a network industry, and as such, 
interoperability is of significant importance; as that, and because of standards’ role in 
Global Governance, we go through the world of Smart Grid standards and evaluate the 
EU standards in the global arena. Standards are seen as an important tool of global 
regulation, so the EU is confronted in the world stage with the adoption of non-EU 
standards. Our work is thus centered on the question of incentives and standards 
strategies needed for the development of Smart Grid in EU countries. 
Keywords: Electricity sector, Regulation, Smart Grids, European Union. 
JEL-codes: L94, L98.  
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Resumo 
Um pouco por todo o mundo, nos países desenvolvidos ou em vias de desenvolvimento, 
assiste-se a uma mudança de paradigma na forma como a electricidade é produzida e 
distribuída. Seja por causas ambientais (UE), envelhecimento das redes (EUA), ou 
crescimento económico exponencial (China), estas mudanças começam a desenrolar-se. 
É consensual que estas transformações são transversais à cadeia de valor do sector 
eléctrico, e implicam investimentos avultados. Desta forma, são precisos mecanismos 
de coordenação de forma a que os interessados (por exemplo operador da rede de 
distribuição) não caiam em situações de hold-up; para além disso, e indo de encontro ao 
tema da nossa dissertação, a estes actores devem ser dados os incentivos para que 
operem mudanças no sentido da implementação de uma Smart Grid (uma rede eléctrica 
automatizada que é anunciada como trazendo mais “inteligência” à forma como a 
electricidade é produzida, transportada, distribuída e consumida). 
Nesta dissertação, propomo-nos, no contexto da União Europeia, avaliar se as políticas 
e regulações em vigor são as mais adequadas para a implementação de uma Smart Grid, 
olhando para a Política Energética da UE, apoios governamentais, e regulação. Estes 
incentivos, maioritáriamente de ordem económica, devem perdurar no tempo uma vez 
que é previsto estas transformações levarem anos (ou mesmo décadas) a serem 
realizadas. Assim como muitos autores, pensamos que estes incentivos devem acontecer 
num contexto de regulação. Devemos também ter em conta que o sector eléctrico se 
insere nas chamadas indústrias de rede, e como tal, a interoperabilidade é de grande 
importância; por isso, e devido ao papel das normas na Global Governance, fazemos 
uma incursão pelas normas das Smart Grids e avaliamos o posicionamento das normas 
Europeias no ambiente global. As normas são uma ferramenta importante da regulação 
global, e no contexto das Smart Grids a UE tem vindo a confrontar-se com a adopção de 
normas não Europeias. Desta forma, a nossa dissertação está centrada na questão dos 
incentivos e estratégias de normalização necessárias ao desenvolvimento de Smart 
Grids nos países Europeus. 
Palavras-chave: Sector Eléctrico, Regulação, Smart Grids, União Europeia. 
Códigos JEL: L94, L98.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The word Energy comes from the Greek ένέργεια (energeia) which means activity, 
operation, while the word Electricity, which also comes from Greek, ήλεκτρον 
(electron) means amber, because electrical effects were produced classically by rubbing 
amber. Since the antiquity, man has been attracted by the electricity phenomena, but it 
was in the 19th century that it turned from a scientific curiosity into an essential tool for 
modern life. Electricity was in fact a major driving force of the Second Industrial 
Revolution, that is to say, an important technology that contributed to mass production 
activity, operation. 
Electricity was then deployed over the territory of the industrialized nations, and the 
grid grew to accommodate its increasing demand, turning up to become a commodity. 
However, this growth was based on the business model introduced by Thomas Edison, 
in which utilities owned the plants that generated electricity, the transmission lines that 
carried it to substations, and the wires that distributed it to customers. Despite of the 
waves of liberalization that started in the 1980s, the grids didn’t improve their 
expanding capability, and we have seen some serious blackouts affecting millions of 
people, such as the 2003 Northeast Blackout in the United States of America (USA), 
and the 2003 Italy Blackout – both caused by lack of reliability and ageing of the grid. It 
is also a fact that during the first half of the 20th century, utilities had unlimited access 
to cheap fossil fuels, and had no incentive to upgrade their inefficient old plants. From 
the recent decades, we have been assisting to a rise in consumption of energy from the 
so-called BRICS1 countries, and we can expect that consumption of electricity will 
further rise (BP, 2012), and with that, the concern on the fossil fuels, and their impact 
on the environment. With this, environmental concerns are also playing a very 
                                                 
1
 BRICS is the title of an association of leading emerging economies, arising out of the inclusion of South 
Africa into the BRIC group in 2010. As of 2012, the group's five members are Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. With the possible exception of Russia, the BRICS members are all developing or 
newly industrialized countries, but they are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and 
significant influence on regional and global affairs. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS, last 
visited August 8, 2013) 
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important part on energy planning. One key measure identified to tackle the transition to 
sustainable and low-carbon industry is the expansion of Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES), and more than that, its integration into the electricity grid. Besides the 
environmental effects, what is intended is to help solving the limitations of storage 
capacities, and at the same time, being economically efficient. 
Thus, the electric grid needs to accommodate the changes to meet challenges of 
improved load control and increased generation from renewables. There are two views 
on how to achieve those goals: one is the adaptation of the current grid by means of 
conventional “Dumb Grid”2 so that it integrates a high share of RES, and the other view 
is to get there by means of a more automated and integrated grid that brings intelligence 
using information and communication technologies, and metering from generation to all 
the final consumers. As for the second view, we are talking about Smart Grid (SG), an 
electrical grid that incorporates Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
and Smart Meters (SM). The drivers for SG are several and different, depending on the 
geopolitical domain we consider. For example, main drivers for SG in USA are the 
ageing and security of the grid, while the EU seems to be more motivated by the 20-20-
20 objectives3. The SG is seen as a means (not an end) of achieving the goals of a global 
energy challenge that countries face in the next years. Wherever these changes are going 
to take place, its development will be part of a major change to the way electricity is 
generated, transmitted, distributed and used, and like any substantial change in national 
infrastructures, the costs will be challenging.  
However, technology alone won't fix all the concerns about the grid, as they are not 
mainly a technological problem – instead, it relates to a whole system, where political 
gridlock, inefficient markets, and shortsighted planning that have created those 
bottlenecks that cannot be solved solely with millions of Smart Meters and ICT 
                                                 
2
 “Dumb grid” is a term used to refer to the traditional grid, which is seen as being based on limited 
information and leaving no real control for consumers. A Dumb grid demands a large amount of physical 
infrastructure, practically meaning more cables needed to be laid, because it will not be able to rely on 
smart distribution of intermittent energy through ICT and therewith compensate peaks in supply or 
demand (Knödler, 2012). 
3
 The climate and energy package is a set of binding legislation which aims to ensure the European Union 
meets its ambitious climate and energy targets for 2020. These targets, known as the "20-20-20" targets, 
set three key objectives for 2020: A 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; 
raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%; A 20% 
improvement in the EU's energy efficiency.(Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm, last visited August 8, 2013 ) 
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infrastructure. Without further policy stability, appropriate regulatory incentives, and 
more investment, may result in not realizing the Smart Grid, and consequently falling 
behind in what can be a new global growth market and a source of prosperity and jobs 
for years to come (Ernest & Young, 2012). Our work proposes to look at a way forward 
to bring the Smart Grid to the stage, and let it play the role of a new energy management 
paradigm. 
1.1 EU Energy Policy 
As (Morais, 2011) refers, although the energy sector was considered a vital area from 
the beginning of European integration process, we observe that the European 
Community, in which the integration process is anchored, surprisingly didn’t have (as 
its origins are the European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC) any 
preparation/reference in what concerns to energy policy. As a consequence, there were 
delays in the construction and consolidation of a global energy policy since the adoption 
of the Treaty4, until the first oil crisis during the seventies. After the second oil crisis, 
there was an approach to the energy supply problem, but the first legislative initiatives, 
for the oil and gas sector, took place only with the raise of the Single Market 
Programme (SMP). 
The first branch of EU Energy Policy to be developed was the energy security. After the 
oil crisis, the EU adopted legislation that specified the emergency level of oil stocks. 
Since then, the European Commission (EC) has been assuming a dominant role, 
although the Member States (MSs) always shown reluctance in transferring their 
decision powers. Thus, the energy security dimension of energy policy provided limited 
opportunities to the strengthening of the energy policy of the EC at a supranational level. 
However, with the recent EU enlargement, and with the dependence of Central and 
Eastern European States on Russian energy, the concerns about energy security have 
seen more attention from Member States that are now more open to the idea of a 
stronger rule of the EC (Tosun and Solorio, 2011). 
                                                 
4
 European Economic Community (EEC) and Rome Treaty. 
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The most important stimuli to the further development of an energy policy were the 
Single European Act5 (SEA), and the subsequent SMP6. These stimuli gave room for 
the institutionalization at a supranational level of policies related with the internal 
market, and regulation and competition (Morais, 2011). The defense of the free-market 
values, by the EC, has been a drive to build the Internal Energy Market that resulted in 
the adoption of three packages of directives (First, Second and Third Packages started in 
1996), which had as main goal the energy market liberalization. 
EC Directives and the Internal Energy Market (IEM) 
In order to implement an Energy Policy, and an Internal Energy Market, it was 
fundamental to make legislation efforts, by producing a set of directives and regulations. 
The institutionalization of environmental policy through the SEA opened an avenue for 
the promotion of Energy Policy in Europe (Morais, 2011). This green dimension 
provided a more effective mean to progress with energy policy. In 2005, the EC started 
to promote the debate about energy, with the main goal of establishing the foundations 
to a new Energy Policy of global scope essential to combat environmental changes. 
Subsequently, the EC promoted a review of the actual energetic challenges, as a guide 
for EU Energy Policy, in which renewable energies, energetic efficiency, and the 
reduction of greenhouse gases effect, were specified as a mandatory requirements to 
limit climate changes7. 
                                                 
5
 The Single European Act (SEA) revises the Treaties of Rome in order to add new momentum to 
European integration and to complete the internal market. It amends the rules governing the operation of 
the European institutions and expands Community powers, notably in the field of research and 
development, environment, and common foreign policy. (Source: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm, last visited 
August 8, 2013 ) 
6
 The Single Market Programme is the result of a detailed timetable and law enforcement process of the 
SEA. This project was based on the European Commission’s 1985 White Paper ‘Completing the Internal 
Market’, a comprehensive blueprint for welding together the fragmented national markets to create a 
genuinely frontier-free single market by the end of 1992. (Source: http://fritz.breuss.wifo.ac.at/Badinger-
Breuss_Quantitative_European_Integration_in_JOVANOVIC_Vol_3_2011_285-315.pdf, last visited 
August 8, 2013  ) 
7
 The document (European Commission, 2006) known as "Green Paper" marks an important milestone in 
developing a common energy policy by regrouping the disparate range of energy policies into a common 
strategy for Europe. This Paper is the result of several summits held by Heads of State and Government in 
the European Union in 2005. In these summits it was recognized a need for a common response to the 
issues of ensuring energy security, effective action against climate change and stable economic conditions. 
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Regarding the competitiveness dimension of the EU Energy Policy, a series of 
directives for the electricity and gas were developed. These directives are composed by 
three packages as illustrated in Figure 18. These efforts are based on the need to address 
the congestion of networks and discrimination along the electricity value chain, and are 
the result of several Benchmarking Reports by the European Commission9.  
 
Figure 1 - EU Energy Policy Development 
Source: Eurostat, Panorama of energy, Energy statistics to support EU policies and solutions, 10 July 2007 
Without going into much detail, the First Package of Directives has thrown the basis for 
the construction of rules for the electricity and gas markets, and established that 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) should have their accounts separated from 
production and commercialization activities (Account Unbundling). The Second 
Package of Directives established that TSOs should be independent from vertically 
integrated undertakings at least in legal, organizational and decision making terms 
(Legal Unbundling). The Second Package also included a regulation that established a 
committee at European level, the ERGEG10, which was constituted by the Member 
States National Regulators. In the Third Package of Directives, the European 
Commission proposed Ownership Unbundling for transmission network as a way of 
                                                 
8
 In this figure the three directive packages are identified as Market Opening-1, Market Opening-2 and 
Market Opening-3, although they are known as First, Second and Third Packages.. 
9
 The annual benchmarking reports on the opening of the electricity and gas markets monitor since 2000 
how EU legislation is implemented across EU. Input for the reports comes from the European Regulators 
Group (ERGEG) and the Commission's own investigations. (Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/legislation/benchmarking_reports_en.htm , last visited August 8, 
2013) 
10
 European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) - consultative organism establish 
according with a decision by European Commission in 11 November 2003. 
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removing competition distortions. This was not a simple process and consensus was 
very difficult to reach, and in reality no consensus on this strict option was found; the 
outcome was a political compromise that leaves three options to comply with stricter 
unbundling requirements (Full Ownership Unbundling, Independent Transmission 
Operator, and Independent System Operator, which we will describe later). 
1.2 Regulation in the EU 
In the context of market liberalization, we can find two extremes in EU - sectors in 
which there are almost no signs of natural monopolies (e.g. the telecommunications), 
and in the other extreme, sectors where the elements that characterize monopolies are 
still present (e.g. water supply). The energy sector may be positioned somewhere 
between these two extremes and as such, liberalization and regulation are of main 
importance. One of the most important questions in the regulation of ex-monopolies is 
entry regulation - that is to say, how easy it is for new competitors to enter the market 
(Motta, 2004), (Viscusi et al., 2005). 
Regulation is an essential (instrumental) tool when it comes to implement policy. We 
are going to see how Energy (in particular Electricity) Regulation gained a European 
dimension. This is important because there shall be a good articulation between EU 
Regulatory Policy and the National Regulatory Authorities (NRA). As for the EU law, 
regulations are transposed to MSs National law by means of directives.  
The way to ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) 
When the liberalization of energy markets started in the EU (during the 1990s), 
simultaneously with the construction of the Internal Energy Market, the dominant idea 
was that competition should be a very important aspect of the energetic sector. However, 
national regulation was not in force in the first directives for the energy market (First 
Package). Still, there were countries (including Portugal) that started liberalization and 
also created national regulators before the directives were approved. We shall note that 
the first directives didn’t contemplate EU level regulation. Instead, the EU proposed a 
voluntary approach to regulation which didn’t result. 
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The Second Package directives identified some barriers to liberalization and 
competition, and tried to find solutions for those constraints, namely i) the need of 
existence of a legal and financial unbundling for the energy network operators; ii) an 
access system to energy networks and transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable 
infrastructure; iii) to ensure these points, the Directives established that the MSs should 
create National Regulation Authorities (NRAs) with a sufficient autonomy degree and 
effective market intervention powers. However, it was found out that the Directive’s 
requirements were not enough to assure open energy markets, competitive and 
efficiently (besides other aspects, it was found excessive market concentration, 
incumbent vertical integration, and foreclosure that created entry barriers to new 
competitors, very little cross border integration, lack of transparency, and lack of fair 
competition in wholesale markets) (European Commission, 2007). Besides that, a 
regulatory gap existed in the cross border regulatory environment. These points directly 
influenced the regulatory side of the Third Package. 
The Third Package has two aspects that we think very important: the first respects to a 
trend to reinforce the separation of commercialization and production activities from 
network operation activities, including transport and distribution (preference for the 
Ownership Unbundling); the second point concerns to a new EU Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators - this is the birth of ACER11. This was an important 
step for regulation at European level and was welcomed by the European Parliament, 
but it was not received with enthusiasm by the European Council. In other words, this 
agreement difficulty represents one solution not very robust institutionally. The Third 
Package also contains legislation at national level - all Member States shall have a 
regulator. 
In March 2007, the European Council considered that once the production and use of 
energy are the main sources of greenhouse gas emissions, an integrated approach to 
climate and energy policy should be taken, in order to avoid the global temperature 
raising. Such an approach means that regulation cannot focus exclusively in market 
questions - it shall take in account the EU objectives related with energetic efficiency 
                                                 
11
 ACER is a EU body which has as mission to assist National Regulatory Authorities in exercising, at 
Community level, the regulatory tasks that they perform in the Member States and, where necessary, to 
coordinate their action. 
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and electricity generation based in RES. In order to accomplish these objectives, it is 
needed appropriate incentive regulation, namely in what respect to energetic efficiency, 
green products, EVs (Electric Vehicles) and interconnections. In such a context, the 
traditional regulation tools shall be reviewed and expanded. 
1.3 Smart Grid and Unbundling 
Network unbundling is the separation of generation and retail activities from network 
business, and has been introduced to guarantee non-discriminatory network access for 
third parties and to foster fair competition. 
Coming back to the Third Package, we will now summarize the EU policy on 
Unbundling, that is, Transmission unbundling. The three options to comply with 
unbundling are: 
Full Ownership Unbundling – requires that the TSO would own both the 
transmission assets and operate the network. It would be independently owned, i.e. 
supply/generation companies could not hold a significant stake in the TSOs. It 
implies that: same person cannot exercise control over a production or supply 
company and at the same time exercise control or any right over a transmission 
system, and vice versa; same person cannot appoint board members of a TSO and 
exercise control or any right over a production or supply company; and same person 
cannot be a member of the board of a TSO and of a production or supply company 
(European Commission, 2010b). Although full ownership unbundling is expected to 
eliminate discrimination incentives and benefit competition, it eliminates firm 
internal coordination along the vertical supply chain. 
Independent System Operator (ISO) – requires separation of system operation 
from ownership of the assets. Supply/generation companies could no longer hold a 
significant stake in the ISO. This option enables the vertically integrated undertaking 
to keep the transmission assets on its balance sheet. ISOs would require sufficient 
funds and personnel not employed at the same time by a vertically integrated group. 
ISO must have a strong say in investment planning, the Transmission System owner 
is legally and functionally unbundled. It also implies significant regulatory 
involvement (European Commission, 2010b). The ISO concept addresses 
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discrimination concerns without requiring ownership changes, but also very 
important is that ISO can be left freedom to coordinate system actors from a central 
perspective (Friedrichsen, 2011). 
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) – In this option the TSO remains 
within the integrated company and the transmission assets remain on its balance sheet. 
Many additional regulatory provisions should ensure that the integrated company 
would have no control over these assets and provide for a huge regulatory burden. In 
fact, the entire vertically integrated undertaking will be subject to severe regulatory 
scrutiny (assets, equipment, staff and identity, effective decision making rights, 
independence of management, and supervisory body) (European Commission, 
2010b).  
The result of these regulations is that European electricity systems are now a mix of 
regulated and competitive activities: power generation, wholesale supply and retail 
supply are now competitive elements of the value chain, and transmission and 
distribution are regulated, as they still be characterized as natural monopolies. Keeping 
unbundling in mind is essential to understand the implications (coordination and 
competition) on SG system organization. 
1.4 EU Energy Policy and Smart Grids: Critical Questions 
In this dissertation we propose to find a way forward that enables regulation to achieve 
the Energy Policy targets by means of a SG. It is consensual that SG may deliver the 
desirable results; however, investing on a SG is a not-so-consensual point. Currently the 
value chain actors (Distribution System Operators (DSOs), TSOs, and Network 
Operators) are not keen on investing on SG in an uncertain environment12. What we 
intend to research is what would be a proper environment, in terms of regulation, that 
may make the implementation of SG move forward having in mind the EU Energy 
Policy objectives. 
 
                                                 
12
 We mean by uncertain the fact that current regulation doesn’t give the proper incentives to invest. 
Besides that, it is not clear who will benefit from these investments, and which task each player will be 
responsible for. 
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Thus, our research questions are the following: 
1. “Will Smart Grid be able to give an answer to main today’s questions such as 
energy security, energy cost and environment impact? 
2. What is the role of economic regulation in providing the incentives to invest in 
Smart Grid? 
Furthermore, these can be disaggregated into two sub-questions: 
Sub-questions: 
1. Is the European regulation designed so that it promotes the implementation of 
Smart Grids (directives, financial funds, support)? 
2. What is the rule of standards on the choices of Smart Grid technologies, and 
how does the global governance of standards can influence those choices (taking in 
account that interoperability is important in network industries)? 
This dissertation is divided in five chapters. The first two chapters bring us to the roots 
of our subject: following this Introduction (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 reviews the main 
concepts of Smart Grid that we found useful to contextualize. Chapter 3 deals with 
regulation of Smart Grid – motivation for building a Smart Grid, and how to get there. 
In Chapter 4 we provide possible ways to progress with Smart Grid implementation, 
mainly by means of regulation and policy. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of 
this work and provides suggestions for future research. 
Before proceeding, we would like to note that this dissertation exceeds the limit of the 
number of pages because Smart Grid is a very recent and critical topic for which 
background information is needed to provide a proper context.  
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Chapter 2  
Smart Grids: basic concepts and context 
Building a SG is very challenging because many aspects shall be taken in account, from 
the technical complexity of these new grids, to the institutional complexity of 
organizing the consensus (coordination) needed for such a shift of electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution paradigm. In our view, the latter needs to be handled by 
means of institutional action, namely at EU level, by means of a coherent Energy Policy 
and institutions that create the right environment to make such large scale investments. 
In this chapter we will see what a SG is, and the motivations to build it (as opposed to 
maintain the current architecture of electricity networks). We make an introduction of 
the electricity market value chain and see important aspects that SG will need to take in 
account such as Distributed Generation (DG), Distributed Energy Resources (DER), 
Demand Side Management (DSM) and Smart Meters (SM). We will also make an 
assessment of current Cost Benefit Analysis (CBAs) on SG.  
2.1 Definition: is there any consensus? 
The term Smart Grid has seen several definitions from author to author, and in different 
contexts. It may be difficult to pick a concise and clear definition, so we are going to 
present a few given by reference institutions.  
According to the EU, (European Commission, 2011c), ”A Smart Grid is an electricity 
network that can cost efficiently integrate the behavior and actions of all users 
connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to ensure 
economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high levels of 
quality and security of supply and safety”. 
As for the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2011), “A Smart Grid is an electricity 
network that uses digital and other advanced technologies to monitor and manage the 
transport of electricity from all generation sources to meet the varying electricity 
demands of end-users. Smart Grids co-ordinate the needs and capabilities of all 
generators, grid operators, end-users and electricity market stakeholders to operate all 
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parts of the system as efficiently as possible, minimizing costs and environmental 
impacts while maximizing system reliability, resilience and stability”. 
The definition given by the United States Department of Energy, seems to give more 
focus on the integration and performance delivery of the following characteristics: “self-
healing from power disturbance events; enabling active participation by consumers in 
Demand Response; operating resiliently against physical and cyber attack; providing 
power quality for 21st century needs; accommodating all generation and storage 
options; enabling new products, services, and markets; optimizing assets and operating 
efficiently”13. (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009) complements the definition with the 
consideration that “The electric industry is poised to make the transformation from a 
centralized, producer-controlled network to one that is less centralized and more 
consumer-interactive. The move to a smarter grid promises to change the industry’s 
entire business model and its relationship with all stakeholders, involving and affecting 
utilities, regulators, energy service providers, technology and automation vendors and 
all consumers of electric power.” 
From all these views, one common thing is that SGs will result in systemic changes in 
the electricity systems: new business models, new service providers, new tasks for 
regulators, and probably new consumer behavior. Many of these ideas are already in 
operation. Yet it is only when they are empowered by means of the two-way digital 
communication and plug-and-play capabilities that exemplify a smarter grid, that 
genuine breakthroughs begin to multiply. We are talking about Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI), Distributed Generation (DG) and Demand Response (DR). 
While supply and demand is a bedrock concept in virtually all other industries, it is one 
with which the current grid struggles mightily because electricity must be consumed at 
the moment it is generated. Without being able to ascertain demand precisely at a given 
time, having the ‘right’ supply available to deal with every contingency is problematic. 
This is particularly true during peak demand, those times of greatest need for electricity 
during a particular period (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009). During the hours of peak 
demand, in addition to base load generators, it is needed to dispatch peak-load 
generators (with relative low marginal costs). As that, the costs of production during 
                                                 
13
 Taken from http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/smart-grid, last visited August 8, 2013  
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peak hours are higher than other hours of the day when demand can be met with base 
load generators. As consumers are not able to know the short-run changes in the costs of 
generation, they receive no price incentive to consume more power when costs of 
production are cheaper, and to reduce consumption when production is more expensive. 
These facts have a consequence in the reliability of the system and on future capacity 
investments decisions, as supply needs to meet daily, seasonal and annual variations in 
load. 
In the last years we have assisted to a dramatic surge of RES; however these energy 
sources have the limitation of generating electricity in specific conditions (electricity is 
generated only in the presence of sun or wind), and thus they are considered as 
intermittent. (Knödler, 2012) suggests four ways to overcome this problem: by 
providing peak load capacity, by importing energy, by establishing storage systems, 
and/or Demand Side Management (DSM). Improvements in metering technologies, 
network management practices and Distributed Generation (DG) technologies are 
enabling Demand Side participation to become a more active component in energy 
market operations.  The main barriers to increasing participation are i) inelasticity of 
demand; and ii) information asymmetry. The first category is often referred to as 
Demand Response (DR) and is the most recent stage in the evolution of DSM 
programmes, a subject we develop in section 2.5. The second aspect is treated in section 
2.6. 
2.2 Smart Grid and the electricity value chain 
SGs are often seen as an effective solution to address some of the toughest challenges 
the electricity industry has faced so far: the integration of renewable on a very large 
scale, the promised rise in number of EVs, the necessity of energy efficiency, the 
improved security of supply and the arrival of the ‘prosumer'. Equipment manufacturers 
and ICT solution providers are eagerly awaiting the hundreds of billions of Euros to be 
invested in the next decades (Lapillonne et all, 2012). To understand how SG affects the 
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electricity market, we need to revise the electricity value chain and the relationship 
between its players14.  
Figure 2 - The grid as it is today 
Source, (EPRI, 2011) 
Figure 3 - The Smart Grid 
Source, (EPRI, 2011) 
(European SmartGrids, 2012) considers as Smart Grid stakeholders the players 
described in Table 4 (see Appendix I). This is certainly a complex environment that 
captures not only the stakeholders of the electric value chain, but also other players and 
concepts such as Telecom providers, EV users, new grid technologies with renewable 
generation, storage, increased consumer participation, sensors, communications and 
computational ability (ICT). This results in a bidirectional electricity infrastructure, 
since the traditional consumption side now also has possibilities to produce electricity. 
For the sake of simplicity and without sacrificing the objectives of this work, we will 
consider and make a summarized characterization of the electricity value chain players 
(these descriptions shall have in mind what the grid looks like today, and the vision of 
future Smart Grid - Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively). 
Traditionally, managing the electricity supply chain consisted of producers and 
consumers acting on the electricity market and awaiting the real-time control of network 
operators and power generation companies. Distributed generation, distributed storage 
                                                 
14
 The traditional electricity value chain is mainly composed of generation, transmission, distribution and 
commercialization. To transport electricity, a large infrastructure has been constructed. This infrastructure 
can be divided into two types of grids: a transmission grid and a distribution grid. This division is related 
to the voltage levels at which the grids operate. The higher the voltage level, the more efficiently 
equivalent amounts of electricity can be transported over long distances, since transmission losses depend 
on current instead of voltage. Generally speaking, the installed capacity shall be able to satisfy a peak 
demand, and transmission lines are used to transport high voltage until the distribution points, and from 
there to homes or industrial customers.   
The transmission grid is operated and maintained by the Transmission System Operator (TSO); the 
distribution grid is connected to the transmission grid and is operated by Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs). Where a TSO is responsible for large-scale electricity transmission, a DSO is responsible for the 
final part in the electricity supply chain, i.e. the delivery towards the customer. TSOs and DSOs are 
monopolists in their respective areas. Therefore, they are bounded by regulations set by governmental 
authorities (Bosman, 2012). 
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and demand side load management are becoming realities across the value chain, having 
important impact on the way the traditional supply chain is managed and balanced, 
leading to a growing need for decentralized intelligence (that is to say, the 
implementation of SG).  
Generation 
Generators are traditionally the generating plants which are away from heavily 
populated areas. The generated electric power is stepped up to a higher voltage at which 
it connects to the transmission network. The generators that can react fast are called 
peak plants, since they take care of the fluctuating peak demand in the electricity 
consumption. While they respond fast to fluctuating demand, in general their energy 
efficiency is relatively low, compared to the energy efficiency of the power plants that 
mainly supply the electricity base load. Already this difference shows that it is 
beneficial to decrease peaks in the electricity demand, in order to improve the energy 
efficiency of generation (Bosman, 2012). 
As (Wissner, 2011) puts, one crucial option that ICT offers in generation is the better 
integration of RES like wind and solar power and cope with the intermittent feed-in of 
these power plants. The main concept is that a SG in driven by a decentralized 
generation architecture. According to (Bosman, 2012), distributed generation emerges 
in two general types: sustainable Distributed Generation (e.g. wind turbines and solar 
panels) and energy efficiency improving generation (e.g. Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP)15). 
Storage 
Because of its efficiency losses and high costs, electricity storage systems have not been 
applied at a large scale. Thus, in the traditional networks, the challenge is to 
continuously find a match between consumption and production. If efficient and less 
costly, storage would probably be the best tool to control balance in the electricity 
                                                 
15
 A micro CHP produces both heat and electricity for household usage at the kW level; the electricity can 
be delivered back to the electricity grid or consumed locally. Combined with a heat buffer, the production 
of heat and electricity can be decoupled and an operator has flexibility in the times that the micro CHP is 
producing, which creates a certain degree of freedom in electricity production. 
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supply chain, as the temporary fluctuations in demand and supply could be better 
managed (acting as a buffer). 
Recently, new techniques of storage emerged; at a domestic scale, electricity storage 
can be combined with a power supply system. EVs can be used as storage devices when 
the car is parked; this gave rise to the Vehicle to Grid (V2G) systems, which help to 
control voltage and frequency in the grid. At a larger scale, Compressed Air Energy 
Storage (CAES) can help control the fluctuation of wind, as well as pumped hydro-
electric energy storage. 
Transmission  
Transmission moves power long distances, often across nations, and sometimes across 
international boundaries, until it reaches its wholesale customer (usually the company 
that owns the local distribution network). Many components of SGs are already known 
from transmission networks where most equipment allows remote supervision and 
control. 
Distribution 
In contrast, distribution networks are largely still operated relying on human 
intervention. Upon arrival at a substation, the power is stepped down in low voltage – 
from a transmission level voltage to a distribution level voltage. As power exits a 
substation, it enters the distribution wiring. Finally, upon arrival at the service location, 
it is stepped down again from the distribution voltage to the required service voltage(s). 
The way customers use electricity networks is changing as a result of trends such as the 
electrification of heat and transport, or the growth of DG. The bidirectional electricity 
flow (as a result of the possibility of consumers becoming also producers - prossumers) 
gives both an increased attention towards load and congestion management, and may 
ask for technical improvements in the infrastructure (e.g. a Smart Metering 
infrastructure has to be clearly defined and implemented) (Bosman, 2012). Thus, with 
SGs, because we can expect a generation feed-in increase (due to integration of DG), 
the power flow in distribution networks is not anymore unidirectional top-down, but 
increasingly also bottom-up; this triggers a change to more actively managed 
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distribution networks, similar to the present management at transmission level 
(Friedrichsen, 2011). 
Consumers/Prosumers 
Recent developments in domestic appliances lead to more flexibility in consumption 
control. Controllable washing machines, dryers, fridges and freezers are responsible for 
a big percentage of the total consumption/demand of a household. Heat pumps are also 
used to supply domestic heat demand, by transferring energy from the soil or the outside 
air. This development means that the total load profile of a household gives room for 
adjustment by a control system, as opposed to the traditional uncontrollable 
consumption. 
The decentralized generation based on small units like Photovoltaic (PV) cells of 
private households or CHP units, creates the role of prosumers, which is a term that 
recognizes the emancipation of customers from electricity producers and feeders 
(Knödler, 2012). 
(Clastres, 2011) has the opinion that the positive effect expected from SG is not 
necessarily a drop in prices but rather a reduction in the bills paid by consumers. A 
different opinion is expressed in (Verbong et all, 2013) stating that although SGs might 
lead to short term benefits, the proportion of income that users will spend on energy is 
bound to rise. Benefits are therefore relative to a future without SG. Besides this, an 
overly positive approach could be harmful to public acceptance when SGs is introduced 
and prices do still rise. 
Management and control 
The introduction of DG, intelligent consumption, and storage devices needs an 
advanced energy monitoring and control. SM is the first step for such an intelligent 
control. Real-time load balancing and congestion management in distribution networks 
is also needed16. 
                                                 
16
 A large system that is in use for years in the traditional electricity supply chain is SCADA (Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition), that, in combination with grid protection systems, secures the actual 
generation of electricity. In this system, human operated control rooms oversee and steer, in combination 
with the help of computer programs, the real-time generation. 
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Several ICT oriented methodologies are proposed to control and manage (a part of) the 
SG, in addition to the already existing management systems that aim at dispatching 
generation, load balancing and congestion management. The demand for more complex 
coordination and flexibility can be most economically achieved through the extensive 
use of ICT; as in other industries, this does not only imply the introduction of new 
devices, but also a fundamental rethinking of the overall system design – this may lead 
to some conflicts: while the incumbent powers of the electricity sector try to keep 
stability and their own roles by maintaining as far as possible the current system logic, 
the ICT industry is more used to conceive high flexible multi-layered systems with a 
multitude of feed-backs and distributed responsibilities, allowing different 
organizational configurations17 (SEFEP, 2012). 
Virtual Power Plant 
A Virtual Power Plant (VPP), is a cluster of distributed generation installations (such as 
micro-CHP, wind-turbines, small hydro, back-up gensets, etc.) which are collectively 
run by a central control entity. This VPP can be comparable to a normal power plant in 
production size. The wide-spread distribution of generators asks for a well-controlled 
generation method. These generators must be scheduled or planned to generate power at 
different times of the day in a way that the combined electricity production of all 
generators matches a given generation profile that resembles the production of a normal 
power plant. 
2.3 Smart Meters 
Annex I of the Third Energy Package (2009/72/EC) states that the MSs shall ensure that 
customers are actively engaged in the electric supply market through “intelligent 
metering systems”. As of 2020, 80% of the consumers shall be equipped with SMs in 
case the roll-out in their country “is assessed positively”. 
SMs are electronic measurement devices used by utilities to communicate information 
for billing customers and operating their electric systems. These meters were first 
applied in commercial and industrial consumers due to the need for more sophisticated 
                                                 
17
 This fact has, as we will see later, an important impact on standardization of Smart Grid. 
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rates and more granular billing data requirements. Due to the decreasing cost of 
technology and advanced billing requirements, they became available to all consumer 
classes. There are two major designations in the context of SMs, one is Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), and the other is Automated Meter Reading (AMR) 
Systems. AMR Systems use one-way communications to collect meter data. AMI was 
developed from AMR to today's two-way communication and data system. Thus AMI 
refers to the combination of meters with two-way communications technology for 
information, monitoring, and control (EEI, 2011).  
Before SG initiatives were established, these meters and systems were referred to as – 
Smart Meters and Smart Meter Systems. Hence, the present state of these technologies 
should be more appropriately referred to as an evolution, not a revolution, because of 
the development and use of SM technology and communications over the last fifteen 
years (EEI, 2011).  
A SG monitors electricity delivery and tracks power consumption with SMs that 
transmit energy usage information to utilities via communication networks. The two-
way nature of SM Systems allows sending commands that operate grid infrastructures, 
such as distribution switches and reclosers18, to provide a more reliable energy delivery 
system19. 
2.4 Distributed Generation 
Transmission lines connect power sources to the grid and have been technologically 
updated with automation and human monitoring over the last few decades. However, 
distribution lines never really became high-tech oriented because they have been mostly 
taken as user end-points of service, where power was delivered to traditional loads. 
We shall note that the shift from fossil fuel and nuclear energy infrastructures to 
renewable energy facilities has mostly followed the “central-station” model 20 . The 
reason for this is the large extension of land needed to install wind and solar facilities 
                                                 
18
 Reclosers are used on overhead distribution systems to detect and interrupt momentary faults. 
19
 This is known as Distribution Automation (DA). 
20
 A “central-station” power plant is a large-scale facility located in a single, often remote location. The 
electricity generated by these plants is then transmitted over long distances to the load centers (urbanized 
or industrial areas) where it is consumed (Hohn, 2012). 
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that generate the same amount of energy as the fossil fuel or nuclear – thus, these 
facilities have been installed away from urban areas. Besides affecting dramatically the 
landscape and natural resources on site, arranging a route for the transmission of energy 
from remote locations can be as challenging as sitting the project itself (The Economist, 
2012), (Hohn, 2012). 
DG has been growing in the last two decades. This type of energy generation is exactly 
the opposite of the “central-station” model. Renewable DGs are located near or within 
the developed areas likely to use the electricity they generate. Renewable DG facilities 
are most commonly solar projects, though wind power, geothermal plants, small 
hydroelectric facilities, and biomass incinerators can be developed at a smaller, more 
distributed scale.  
There are many definitions for DG, and it is called differently in different countries. 
Some describe this technology in terms of voltage, whilst others based on the generation 
capacity, interconnection and location. Nevertheless, the main objective of DG is to get 
the electricity from point of generation close to the point of consumer. (Hidayatullah, 
2011). 
DG can provide many benefits; according to (Hohn, 2012), “central-station” renewable 
energy projects in the USA take too long to permit and connect to the grid, while a 
larger number of smaller DG projects can quickly be brought online21. Other benefits 
are that DG is increasingly cost effective22, provides local equitable economic benefits23, 
minimizes the environmental impact of renewable energy 24 , and increases energy 
security25. Although DG has benefits, there are also barriers to its implementation. 
These barriers are related with the interconnection (in terms of ability of the load 
generated on to the grid), the financial terms on which electricity is sold, and the 
permitting of the physical project. 
                                                 
21
 This fact is important when governments are willing to achieve targets for renewable energy. 
22
 Compared with “central-station” that although benefiting from economies of scale, also needs to take in 
account environment and transmission costs. 
23
 As the installation of DG is not centralized, the costs of sales, installation and maintenance can be 
integrated in local economies. 
24
 Solar infrastructure can be placed in already existing structures, and almost no transmission 
infrastructure may be required. 
25
 As opposite to centralized generation, that when there is a failure (system or transmission line goes 
down), in DG results in a more resilient energy supply as it is widespread. 
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2.5 Demand Side Management 
In order to meet the demanded energy, utilities need to be designed in a way that in a 
peak, the supply shall meet that demand - thus, energy generation is not efficient. One 
way to reduce these inefficiencies is to optimize demand side. This is done by means of 
Demand Side Management (DSM). SMs combined with communications are the way to 
increase participation on the demand side by providing new pricing structures and 
overcoming information asymmetry. An important aspect of SG is network flexibility, 
and this is related with the integration of intermittent energy resources such as wind and 
solar, so Demand Response (DR) is important in contributing to this flexibility. 
Advanced communications, control methods and ICT including sophisticated metering 
are central to achieve this goal. 
Demand Side Management involves the planning, implementation and monitoring of 
utility’s activities with the aim of involving customers to achieve changes in the utility’s 
load shape. According to (Gellings, 2009), these programs include load management, 
new uses, strategic conservation, electrification, customer generation and adjustments in 
market share. 
Although the focus in SG discussion has been mainly on the need to integrate DG, 
attention is increasingly turning to the demand side, because of further energy demand 
and introduction of new loads such as EVs (the addition of EVs is expected to almost 
double the current average electricity demand per household). So, there is a pressure on 
the system related to the volatility and capacity of the infrastructure. SG promises to 
take care of these problems by making demand to follow generation. This introduces the 
need for more local balancing of supply and demand, including more measuring and 
monitoring of flows, and the use of communication tools to maintain network stability 
(Verbong et all, 2013). DSM shall allow consumers to make informed decisions about 
consumption, adjusting both the timing and quantity of their electrical use. It promises 
to cut costs for commercial customers, households, and to help utilities to operate more 
efficiently (Davito et al., 2010). To implement this vision, a two-way communication 
along the electricity value chain is needed. These two-way communications were not 
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available during the inception of the DSM concept26, so they serve to update the DSM 
vision. 
Despite of its broad definition, DSM mainly results in the implementation of two main 
concepts: Demand Response (DR) and Energy Efficiency and Conservation. These 
activities allow consumers a greater role in shifting their own demand for electricity 
during peak periods, and reducing their energy consumption overall. DR programs 
transfer consumer load during periods of high demand to off-peak periods, and can 
reduce critical peak demand27 or daily peak demand28. The result of shifting daily peak 
demand is the flattening of the load curve (meaning more electricity at less expensive 
base load generation). DR programs can also save the cost of building additional 
generation capacity to meet future peak demand. As for Energy Conservation and 
Efficiency, Energy Conservation is related with encouraging consumers to save money 
by giving up some energy (e.g. turn up thermostat a few degrees in summer), and 
Energy Efficiency programs allow consumers to use less energy to receive the same 
level of service (e.g. replacing an old home appliances with a more energy efficient 
models). Many pilots have shown that real-time access to information provided by the 
network can cut energy consumption (Davito et al., 2010). Additional gains in energy 
efficiency can be achieved through technologies that provide target education or real-
time verification of consumer demand reduction. (Verbong et all, 2013) makes a review 
on the subject and the literature suggests that a reduction in energy consumption of 
between 5% and 15% is possible; recent trials show a mixed picture: for the US it 
results in a demand reduction between 4% and 15%, while similar experiments in 
Ireland and in the United Kingdom (UK) resulted in a reduction of only 3%. Due to a 
lack of long term experiences it is yet unclear to what extent these effects are temporary 
or lasting, and if users are returning to their old practices. 
Pricing is central to DR strategies and its overall aim is to increase the elasticity of 
electricity demand by giving customers price signals that are more cost-reflective. More 
advanced forms of pricing require advanced metering solutions. Until recently, the cost 
of time-of-use metering was substantially less than real-time metering, making the 
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 DSM is a term coined by EPRI in early 1980s. 
27
 Critical peak demand is the 20-50 hours of greatest demand throughout the year. 
28
 Daily peak demand is the maximum demand during a 24-hour period. 
 23 
 
implementation of real-time pricing limited to industrial applications. Due to reduction 
of the cost of metering in the last decade, it became possible to combine real-time 
pricing with forms of automated DR technology so that responding to frequent price 
changes does not always require customer intervention (Haney et all, 2009). If 
consumers can respond to variable energy prices, their energy bill may be reduced. For 
energy companies and network operators, benefits result from a lower peak in energy 
demand, requiring fewer investments in production and transport capacity. Empirical 
evidence for the potential of financial stimuli, for consumers, is mixed: as for (Verbong 
et all, 2013), price benefits for a consumer are less than 0.5% and substantial reductions 
in energy use face several social and technical barriers and limitations. (FERC, 2009) 
estimates that DR programs can cut peak demand by 20% within the next 10 years. 
Consumers’ active involvement in DR will encourage themselves to adapt to new and 
smart patterns, introducing flexibility to the way electricity is consumed. New products 
for customer awareness are available, such as home displays, apps, controls, etc. while 
new ones will be developed. The most important aspect of SG from a DSO perspective 
is to facilitate effective DR in order to adjust local energy usage to locally available 
production to avoid overload of the grid and reduce network losses. This is the key to a 
smart electricity market with a high degree of DER sources as is foreseen. Effective DR 
functions will result in lower energy costs and reduced usage of fossil fuel-based 
electricity production contributing to lower carbon output (GEODE, 2013). 
2.6 Information: coordination and privacy issues 
We have just seen that the effects of improving the available information on customer 
energy consumption have been explored mainly to understand how better information 
can encourage more energy efficient behavior, i.e., reductions in total consumption. The 
conclusions of the work in the UK and those from the international review conducted by 
(Darby, 2006) suggest that there is growing evidence that more detailed information on 
energy consumption has a positive impact on levels of energy efficiency. 
The information infrastructure is a vital component of SGs. Decentralized approaches 
towards control reinforce the demand on information and communication across the 
system. This is likely to generate extensive data flow. This data is on the one hand price 
information flowing to consumers and thereby informing them about system conditions. 
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On the other hand it is information about current status of generation, load, substations, 
other system components, or the system conditions such as voltage or frequency. In the 
simplest case diverse users could jointly use one common information structure for 
diverse purposes: network information, DSM, VPPs, and SMs (Friedrichsen, 2011). 
Privacy is considered as an issue that can block successful introduction of SGs and 
DSM. Detailed data on electricity consumption gives involved actors a lot of 
information on consumer behavior. This raises an important question which is the 
ownership and control of data generated by SMs. As (Knödler, 2012) points out in her 
literature review, Smart Metering will entail a “data explosion”, which has to be based 
on data protection measures, because if consumers fear about personal data the whole 
SG development will fail (for example in 2008, the Dutch government debated a 
mandatory 100% roll-out of SM but public resistance, mainly due to data concerns, 
forced the government to withdraw from its initial plans and consider a voluntary roll-
out). 
2.7 The Economic Case for Smart Grid (Cost Benefit Analysis) 
As noted by several authors, SGs are seen as an additional instrument to achieve targets 
to promote competition, to increase the safety of electricity systems, and to combat 
climate change (Clastres, 2011), (European Commission, 2012a). However, SGs 
involve huge investments that the electricity value chain players are reluctant to make. 
Without a clear definition of the scope of SG investments, costs and benefits are 
difficult to assess. In this section we present literature review for CBA made for UK 
(Ernest & Young, 2012) and USA (EPRI, 2011). There is also some work on CBA for 
EU (Knödler, 2012). 
There is one comprehensive SG investment cost and benefit evaluation for the US, 
which is (EPRI, 2011). In this study, the costs cover a wide variety of enhancements to 
bring the power delivery system to the performance levels required for a SG. The costs 
include the infrastructure to integrate DER and to achieve full customer connectivity, 
but exclude the cost of generation, the cost of transmission expansion to add renewables 
and meet load growth, and a category of customer costs for SG-ready appliances and 
devices.  
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Table 1 - Summary of Estimated Cost and Benefit of the 
SG 
Source: (EPRI, 2011) 
Figure 4 - Total Smart Grid Costs 
Source: (EPRI, 2011) 
 
Table 2 - Possible Consumer Implications of the EPRI Estimate of Smart Grid Costs 
Source: (EPRI, 2011) 
As we can see from Figure 4, and the analysis from (EPRI, 2011), most of the costs will 
be borne by DSOs (around 70%); TSOs will bear between 20 and 25% of the costs and 
Consumers less than 10%. We can also see from Table 2, for consumers, most of the 
cost will fall onto residential and commercial customers. Their bill is expected to 
increase by an average of 8.4% to 12.8%. Industrial users are not expected to be 
significantly impacted. 
The only economic study we found about a possible SG at European scale was (Knödler, 
2012). This study’s scope is an European SG defined as 27+2 (including Norway and 
Switzerland) national SGs that are interconnected. The author seeks an answer for the 
cost effectiveness of an European SG, how are the costs distributed among market 
actors, and what are the opportunity benefits of a SG compared to a Dumb Grid adapted 
to integrate RES. The only regularity that was found across all CBAs is that in the end, 
consumers profit in most cases, whereas the grid operator or energy supplier has to bear 
the main costs and seldom profits. Knödler also considers the investment needed for an 
electricity grid being able to feed-in a high share of RES; here the author bases on 
studies that deal with the transmission investments and others that also consider 
distribution investments. The author finds out that annual infrastructure investment 
costs from different studies (ENTSO-E, EU Commission, Greenpeace, and IEA) vary 
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considerably, and points the different time horizons and scope (transmission, and 
distribution investments) as one explanation for the great differences. This emphasizes 
the need for more investigation on necessary investments. Other outcome from 
Knödler’s work relates to the benefits on capacity effect and energy effect. The first 
takes into account the shifting of peak load demand to off-peak hours, and the latter 
considers possible savings of households through Smart Metering. The main result are 
possible benefits amounting to EUR 944 M to EUR 3.2 Bn for the capacity effect and to 
EUR 3.7 Bn to EUR 11 Bn for the energy effect. (Knödler, 2012) also finds out that the 
costs for a SG solution are higher than for a Dumb solution within a first investment 
period – the main reasons for this are that the bidirectional communication has to be set 
up once, and the Smart Metering infrastructure has to be rolled-out once, too. However, 
a Dumb grid would not deliver the benefits a SG will – on the contrary the investments 
for a Dumb grid will increase in the long run as much more transmission lines have to 
be installed since no intelligent distribution can be used. This leads to the conclusion 
that the investment decisions shall take in account a long-term perspective. However, 
these investments are not quantified in (Knödler, 2012), and as is noted in (Prüggler and 
Bremberger, 2011), the question of which of the options (“Dumb” solution or SG) is 
more sustainable in terms of costs vs. benefits for society especially in the long-run, has 
not yet been completely answered. 
According to (Ernest & Young, 2012), there is strong consensus in the UK and 
internationally about the long term need to move to SG, and a number of countries have 
quantified its benefits and stand ready to take advantage of the growth it might deliver. 
However in the UK, there is less clarity about how to make it happen, or the speed at 
which the transition needs to take place. (Ernest & Young, 2012) presents two major 
findings. The first is that the initial investment for moving ahead with SG development 
sooner than later appears very strong: for example, the report’s figures indicate that the 
benefits of moving in a timely fashion far outweigh the risks and appear robust across a 
number of different scenarios. The second is that the timely creation of a SG can unlock 
significant benefits in other industries, providing a welcome boost to growth, jobs and 
exports.  
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Roll-out for Smart Meters and Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
Europe has enjoyed notable success with SMs. In 2006, Italy became the first country in 
Europe to complete a national SM program after Italian utility Enel conducted a five-
year €2 billion ($2.6 billion) scheme - mainly to reduce non-technical losses - for its 30 
million customers. Elsewhere, Scandinavia leads the way. Sweden also achieved full-
scale penetration in 2010, while Finland, Norway and Denmark are likely to achieve 
their targets by 2016.  Yet for many EU nations which did not take it upon themselves 
to be early adopters, SM programs have struggled (Energybiz, 2013). 
As part of the Third Package, based on a provision in the Electricity directive 
(2009/72/EC), the EU has mandated that all MSs deploy SMs to 80% of customers by 
2020, if economically feasible. Based on best practices and projects in MSs, by April 
2012, the Commission developed guidelines and new instruments to further stimulate 
the rollout of SM Systems in the present decade, monitoring the progress of current 
Smart Metering projects in the EU and supporting promising R&D and pilot projects in 
SG29. All EU countries were meant to complete Smart Metering CBA30 by September 
2012. The coordination of this activity is with DG Energy 31, and assessment criteria and 
required functionalities have been developed in cooperation with DG INFSO32 and DG 
JRC33. These CBAs should give a positive or negative CBA which would result in 
going (or not going) ahead with a roll-out. Most nations have reported a positive Cost 
Benefit Analysis, although there were some exceptions. The Czech Republic’s analysis 
was negative and has recommended its rollout to start in 2018, while Germany delayed 
                                                 
29
 Commission recommendation on preparations for the roll-out of smart metering systems [C/2012/1342] 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32012H0148:EN:NOT, last visited 
August 8, 2013  
30
 Guidelines for conducting a cost-benefit analysis of Smart Grid projects 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/20120427_smartgrids_guideline.pdf, last visited 
August 8, 2013  
31
 See footnote 36 below. 
32
 EU Directorate General Information Society and Media or "DG INFSO" is a Directorate-General of the 
European Commission. From 1 July 2012, the name of the DG became Directorate General for 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology or DG CONNECT (internally also DG CNECT). 
33
 The Joint Research Centre is the scientific and technical arm of the European Commission. It is 
providing the scientific advice and technical know-how to support a wide range of EU policies. The JRC 
has seven scientific institutes, located at five different sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Spain. The Smart Electricity Systems and Interoperability team (or Action, as it is officially named) 
is part of the Energy Security Unit at the JRC Institute for Energy and Transport, located both in Petten 
(NL) and Ispra (IT). 
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the publication of its report until February 2013 (Energybiz, 2013) 34. Smart Metering 
market continues to be negatively affected by macroeconomic challenges, as well as 
delays in national regulatory frameworks. The complexity of issues pertaining to Smart 
Metering (financing, privacy, data security, and so on) has made the national 
discussions challenging, particularly as they need to result in sound national regulatory 
and legal frameworks guiding the rollouts.35  
◆ 
Before we move to the next chapter, we shall note that the distributed and decentralized 
nature of SG is at the same time its strength and its weakness. These characteristics ask 
not only for a highly coordinated operation but also a high degree of investment 
coherence along the value chain. Thus, regulation shall not only work as an incentive, 
but also as a way of ensuring that each player is contributing to a system transformation. 
We also think that interoperability, by means of standardization, is a way of 
coordinating the development of this system architecture. As we have seen, for both the 
USA and the EU cases, the biggest costs are being placed under the responsibility of 
regulated businesses (especially in DSOs). Thus, it means that regulators shall be able to 
design regulations that give the appropriate incentives to regulated companies to invest 
in SGs.  
                                                 
34
 It was not possible to find more information about Germany CBA assessment after the publication date 
of (Energybiz, 2013). 
35https://idc-insights-community.com/energy/smart-
grid/personalobservationsfromtherecentsmartutilitiescentralampeasterneuro, last visited August 8, 2013 
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Chapter 3  
EU Energy Policy and Regulation for Smart Grid  
In the previous chapter, we have seen that in order to implement a SG, huge investments 
need to be done by some players of the value chain, especially by DSOs. However, with 
current regulation, DSOs are not willing to make such investments (EURELECTRIC, 
2011). It is necessary to create a new regulation design that makes them to appropriately 
balance short run concerns with long run concerns, that is, a greatest focus on dynamic 
efficiency. 
In this chapter, we revisit the EU Energy Policy relative to SG, the regulation 
frameworks currently enforced, and assessments of the ability of those frameworks to 
provide the incentives needed for SG implementation. We will make a short review of 
regulation tools, and look at regulation innovation examples that may work as point of 
departure for the demanding SG regulation. We also give attention to one of the most 
important aspects of network industries – interoperability. This chapter thus lays the 
foundations for the discussion of what is the way forward for SG implementation. 
3.1 EU Energy Policy for Smart Grid 
The EU Energy Policy shall be considered as an important source of guidelines and 
regulations for the EU countries. As we will see in this section and in particular for SGs, 
the discussion in EU is being made by several bodies, although (apparently), sometimes, 
not in a well-coordinated way. 
The EU Third Package has been an important step to establish the context of SG in the 
EU energy policy/regulation framework. In this package, European law introduced the 
concept of intelligent grids and intelligent metering systems. It is also important to 
consider the work being done at the EC level and European Regulators concerning the 
standardization and the new shape of regulatory policy in the implementation stage. The 
efforts taken by the EC to promote SGs have the involvement of several Directorate-
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General (DGs) 36  such as DG Energy (Grid activities such as: Competitive Energy 
Markets, Energy Efficiency, Integration of Fluctuating Renewables), DG Enterprise & 
Industry (ICT, Electrical Equipment, Appliances), DG Information and Society, and DG 
Research and Innovation. 
From the Communication "Smart Grids: from innovation to deployment" (European 
Commission, 2011a), five objectives are considered as key: 1. Developing technical 
standards, 2. Ensuring data protection for consumers, 3. Establishing a regulatory 
framework to provide incentives for SG deployment, 4. Guaranteeing an open and 
competitive retail market in the interest of consumers, and 5. providing continued 
support to innovation for technology and systems. 
 
Figure 5 - EU Energy Policy Development  
(Adapted from (European Commission, 2012b)) 
In order to understand the current EU energy regulatory environment, we make a course 
into the initiatives and directions that the EU/EC made (beyond the important Third 
Package). Figure 5 gives a summary of the EU Energy Policy initiatives. 
Smart Grids Task Force (SGTF) 
The Smart Grids Task Force (to implement the SG for the the European Internal 
Market) was set up by the European Commission (EC) at the end of 2009 (under the 
provision of the Third Energy Package). The SGTF reached a consensus in its first years 
                                                 
36
 The Commission is divided into several departments and services. The departments are known as 
Directorates-General (DGs). Each DG is classified according to the policy it deals with. The Commission 
services deal with more general administrative issues or have a specific mandate, for example fighting 
fraud or creating statistics. (Source: http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm, last visited August 8, 2013 ) 
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on policy and regulatory directions for the deployment of SGs. SGTF has also issued 
key recommendations for standardization, consumer data privacy and security37. 
The SGTF is organized as a Steering Committee composed by representatives from 
Commission Services, Regulators, Industries (such as DSOs and TSOs), and Consumers. 
It is supported by four Ad-hoc expert working groups (1. Standardisation, 2. Data 
Protection and Security, 3. Regulation: market model and options, 4. Infrastructure) 
which have delivered reports in 2011. In 2012, the EC updated the Mission and the 
Framework Programme for the SGTF and decided to extend its activities for two more 
years. As a result, a new Steering Committee was appointed (with a stronger 
participation of the telecom industry). The updated mandate emphasizes that the key 
challenges for SG deployment are, first, largely of regulatory nature; second, to develop 
appropriate standards; and third, to support and launch appropriate infrastructures and 
co-ordination/dissemination of lessons learned (European Commission, 2012c). 
During 2011 the EC adopted a Communication on Smart Grids (European Commission, 
2011a), issued a Mandate for SG standards 38 39 40  to the European Standardization 
Organizations (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI) and created an Inventory of SG projects and 
lessons learned in the EU. The EC also adopted a Recommendation for the roll-out of 
SM Systems41 and issued Guidelines for conducting CBAs of SG projects42 in 2012.  
European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) 
The European Energy Programme for Recovery is a 4 billion Euro programme that was 
set up in 2009 to co-finance projects designed to make energy supplies more reliable 
                                                 
37
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/taskforce_en.htm, last visited August 8, 2013 
38
 Mandate M/490 for Smart Grids (March 2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2011_03_01_mandate_m490_en.pdf, last 
visited August 8, 2013  
39
 Mandate M/468 for electric vehicles (June 2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2010_06_04_mandate_m468_en.pdf, last 
visited August 8, 2013 
40
 Mandate M441 for smart meters (March 2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2009_03_12_mandate_m441_en.pdf, last 
visited August 8, 2013 
41
 Commission recommendation on preparations for the roll-out of smart metering systems [C/2012/1342] 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32012H0148:EN:NOT, last visited 
August 8, 2013 
42
 Guidelines for conducting a cost-benefit analysis of Smart Grid projects 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/20120427_smartgrids_guideline.pdf, last visited 
August 8, 2013 
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and help reduce greenhouse emissions, while simultaneously boosting Europe's 
economic recovery. The projects cover 3 broad fields: 44 gas and electricity 
infrastructure projects, 9 offshore wind projects and 6 carbon capture and storage 
projects43. The EEPR was set up in the wider context of the global effort undertaken at 
EU level to face the financial crisis that erupted in 2008, and to stimulate economic 
recovery. 
Energy Infrastructure Package/Proposal 
On 17 November 2010, the EC presented its energy infrastructure priorities for the next 
two decades. In the Communication44, the EC defines EU priority corridors for the 
transport of electricity, gas and oil. This map of priorities will serve as a basis for future 
permit granting and financing decisions on concrete EU projects. 
In 2011, EC adopted the proposal for a Regulation on "Guidelines for trans-European 
energy infrastructure"45, which aims at ensuring that strategic energy networks and 
storage facilities are completed by 2020. To this end, the EC has identified 12 priority 
corridors and areas covering electricity, gas, oil and carbon dioxide transport networks. 
It proposes a regime of "Common Interest" for projects contributing to implementing 
these priorities and having this label (Projects of Common Interest (PCI)). The EC also 
adopted the proposal for a Regulation on “Guidelines for trans European 
telecommunications networks”46, which aims to establish a series of guidelines covering 
the objectives and priorities envisaged for broadband networks and digital service 
infrastructures in the field of telecommunications. It identifies PCIs for the deployment 
of broadband and digital service infrastructures. 
                                                 
43
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/, last visited August 8, 2013 
44
 Communication "Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond - A Blueprint for an integrated 
European energy network" [COM/2010/0677] 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0677:EN:HTML:NOT, last 
visited August 8, 2013 
45
 Proposal for a Regulation on "Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure" [COM/2011/658] 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011PC0658:EN:NOT, last visited 
August 8, 2013 
46
 Proposal for a Regulation on "Guidelines for trans European telecommunications networks and 
repealing Decision" [COM/2011/657] 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0657:FIN:EN:PDF, last visited 
August 8, 2013 
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These regulations have identified SGs deployment across the EU as a priority thematic 
area for infrastructure investment up to 2020. This legislation is vital as it determines 
fundamental parameters for future SGs in EU, their interoperability, flexibility and 
capacity to handle an increasing share of renewable energy sources and an even more 
decentralized production of energy as well as access to ICT. On 12 March 2013, the 
European Parliament adopted in first reading in plenary session, which opens for final 
adoption of the text after approval by the Council. The text needs now to be backed by 
the Council before final adoption. After approval, it should enter into force by the 
beginning of 201447. 
Energy Efficiency Directive 
The EU is aiming for a 20% cut in Europe's annual primary energy consumption by 
2020. The Commission has proposed several measures to increase efficiency at all 
stages of the energy value chain. The measures focus on the public transport and 
building sectors, where the potential for savings is greatest. Other measures include the 
introduction of SMs (which encourage consumers to manage better their energy use), 
and clearer product labeling48. On 22 June 2011, the Commission proposed a new 
Directive to increase Member States' efforts to use energy more efficiently at all stages 
of the energy value chain. On 4 October 2012, the Council endorsed the political 
agreement on the Energy Efficiency Directive. The European Parliament casted its 
favorable vote on 11 September 2012. 
The directive includes provisions on DG and DR, which will help the market to evolve 
in this direction. Regarding DR, the directive has two key provisions in which MSs 
have to ensure that: 1) DR be allowed to participate alongside supply in electricity 
markets, and 2) grid operators treat DR providers in a non-discriminatory manner when 
providing balancing and reserve services. The Directive also encourages MSs to remove 
disincentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that might hamper the participation 
of DR in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement. These provisions are 
crucial requirements for creating the conditions necessary for an open and fair market 
where demand side resources can compete freely alongside supply. 
                                                 
47
 http://sustainableenergylaw.blogspot.pt/2013/03/european-parliament-approves-eu-energy.html, last 
visited August 8, 2013 
48
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/index_en.htm, last visited August 8, 2013 
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Renewables Directive 
The Directive establishes a common framework for the use of Renewable Energy within 
the EU in order to limit greenhouse gas emissions and to promote cleaner transport. 
Each MS has a target for the use of energy from renewable sources, which is calculated 
according to its gross final energy consumption for the year 2020. The MSs shall 
establish national action plans which set the share of energy from renewable sources 
consumed in transport, as well as in the production of electricity and heating, for 2020. 
Each MS must be able to guarantee the origin of electricity, heating and cooling 
produced from RES. Decentralized energy systems are supported as well as the use of 
agricultural material such as manure, slurry and other animal and organic waste for 
biogas production. MSs should aim to diversify the mix of energy from renewable 
sources in all transport sectors. The Commission should present a report to the 
European Parliament and the Council by 1 June 2015 outlining the potential for 
increasing the use of energy from renewable sources in each transport sector. MSs 
should build the necessary infrastructures for energy from renewable sources in the 
transport sector. 
Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC, Art.16) views SGs as an enabler for integration of 
increasing renewable energy into the grid and obliges the MSs to develop transmission 
and grid infrastructure towards this aim. 
Network Codes 
A set of common EU-level rules (termed ‘Network Codes’) was included in the Third 
Package and Regulation 714/2009/EC49, with the aim of covering the technical and 
market issues for cross-border electricity exchange. 
National systems are linked together through interconnectors. These are transmission 
networks operated jointly by the TSOs at each end: the respective TSOs at each side of 
the border coordinate this interconnection between them. Internally, the individual 
national networks are relatively well-connected, whereas the degree of connection 
between national markets is substantially lower. This represents a physical barrier to 
                                                 
49
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/infrastructure/infrastructure_en.htm, last visited August 8, 
2013 
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cross-border electricity flows. Some of the network codes regard the coordination of 
TSO on interconnectors, because the purpose and goal of the procedure is to establish a 
common set of rules for cross-border electricity exchange. While not affecting the 
amount of physical capacity on interconnectors per se, they might affect the use of this 
capacity. Thus, these codes could influence cross-border network operation as well as 
cross-border trade (Jevnaker, 2012). 
Beyond the procedure for developing common cross-border network codes for 
electricity (‘the NC procedure’), two pan-European associations, European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and ACER, were 
established with the Third Package. ENTSO-E is a single, comprehensive EU-level 
association for TSO cooperation, whereas ACER is a European regulatory agency (as 
described in section 1.2).  
Based on Framework Guidelines written by ACER, ENTSO-E, in close cooperation 
with stakeholders, has to draft a network code on a particular subject. Those network 
codes are assessed by ACER to ensure they are in line with the Guidelines and, once 
this is the case, they are submitted to the EC. Finally the network codes go through the 
Comitology procedure50 , in which they are scrutinized and agreed by MSs, before 
becoming directly applicable pieces of legislation. (ENTSO-E, 2013) 
3.2 Regulation revisited 
In order to fully understand current regulation methods and having SG in mind, we 
make a short revision of the regulatory tools available. 
(Vanhanen et all, 2010) provide a literature review on recent scientific papers and other 
relevant publications, emphasizing the incentives of alternative regulation models. In 
this paper the authors look at the classical regulation mechanisms, cost-based and 
incentive regulation, and provide an insight of their advantages and limitations. 
Cost-based regulation 
                                                 
50
 Comitology in the European Union refers to a process by which EU law is modified or adjusted and 
takes place within "comitology committees" chaired by the European Commission. The official term for 
the process is committee procedure. Comitology committees are part of the EU's broader system of 
committees that assist in the making, adoption, and implementation of EU laws. 
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As for the cost-based regimes, we know that this approach results in poor performance 
with distorted investment incentives 51  (no investment risk, yet fixed return on 
investment), perverse efficiency incentives (loss of revenue when reducing costs) and 
lack of managerial effort (distorted market signals and limited managerial rewards). 
Cost-based regulation was developed in the USA as a form of regulation of private 
monopolies (Hertog, 2010). 
Incentive regulation (Cap regulation) 
As opposite to the USA, in Europe, monopolies were regulated as public enterprises. 
During the privatization of public enterprises in Europe, it was consensual that one of 
the more important objectives of those privatizations was that those companies would 
become more efficient. In response to the limitations of cost-based regimes applied in 
USA, Stephen Littlechild designed a high powered52 regime that allows the regulated 
firm to retain any realized efficiency gains. In Cap regimes, the regulator caps the price 
or revenue for the regulated company for a pre-determined period. The key to the 
incentive is the performance independent payment; to maximize profits, the companies 
minimize costs and optimize their efforts, achieving cost efficiency. Thus there is a 
saving in OPEX. As a drawback, companies may increase costs towards the end of the 
regulatory period in anticipation of future caps reviews, consequently limiting the 
efficiency incentives53. 
Incentive regulation (Yardstick competition) 
Yardstick regimes try to mimic the market by making observations in order to estimate 
the production costs in a given period. Putting it simple, the allowed revenue for a 
company in a given period would be set ex post and determined by the costs in the same 
period of other companies operating in similar conditions. Thus, the revenue of the 
company isn’t determined by its own costs but by the performance of the market. 
                                                 
51
 Averch-Johnson-effect. 
52
 In the context of regulation, we have two basic regimes: Low-powered regimes (cost-plus, cost 
recovery) and High-powered regimes (revenue caps, price caps). High-powered regimes promote efficient 
operation when the task is well specified, the risk is contained and the result is observable. Low-powered 
regimes promote efficient operation when the task or the results are poorly specified but the means are 
observable. 
53
 This is known as the Ratchet effect. 
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Menu of contracts and quality regulation 
Instead of choosing a single regulation scheme, the regulator can propose a menu of 
multiple regulations. The idea of using a menu of contracts is to abandon a notion of 
one-size-fits-all. Besides that, a menu can be one way to reduce any information rent. 
That is, we can use a menu to “solve” adverse selection problems. 
Besides price, quality is an important parameter in the relationship between companies 
and customers. However, there are some aspects we need to take in account: one is the 
cost of ensuring a higher quality level that may exceed the benefits of the present 
quality level, and the other is that any change in the regulatory approach will change the 
behavior of the agents (in particular, a movement towards a higher powered incentive 
regulation will induce the firms to focus more on cost minimization with a possible 
adverse effect on quality). So, the basic underlying problem is to determine the optimal 
trade-off between the costs of producing higher quality and the benefits derived from it. 
Investment incentives in a cost efficiency regulation scheme 
(Müller, 2012) picks the fundamental question regarding regulation of SGs, i.e., does 
current incentive regulation provides the right investment incentives to enable 
technological progress and dynamic efficiency in the network infrastructure? The author 
observes that “reviewing the academic literature leads to the conclusion that incentive 
regulation puts a strong focus on productive efficiency. In contrast, long-term incentives 
for investments into a technological upgrade of the network infrastructure, which 
require a dynamically efficient resource allocation of CAPEX, are not sufficiently 
promoted. A regulatory dilemma emerges vis-à-vis the on-going transformation of the 
energy system”. 
This problem is central in our dissertation and we will come back to it in Chapter 4, and 
in section 3.3 to review how this is being handled by some regulators. 
3.3 Beyond Standard Incentive Regulation  
(Viscusi et al., 2005) point several problems to the traditional regulation regimes (cost-
recovery), namely the weak incentives provided to reduce costs, or adopt efficient 
practices, and the lack of price flexibility between rate cases that prevents the regulated 
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firm from efficiently responding to cost and demand shocks. Thus, as we have seen, 
these deficiencies led to a series of innovations in the regulatory policy (Incentive 
Regulation), which were designed to create incentives for the regulated firm to lower 
cost, innovate, adopt efficient pricing practices, and improve quality. In section 3.2 we 
briefly revisited several forms of incentive regulation. The common properties of these 
regulatory policies give the firm a certain degree of discretion in pricing and allow them 
to share in profit increases. As we know, one of the main objectives of market 
liberalization was to lower cost for users; the first regulatory phase that followed 
unbundling was geared towards a cost-efficient management of grids through the 
minimization of OPEX and rationalization of investments. The economic objective was 
to be achieved without endangering the quality of power and the security of supply. If 
SG is chosen as solution for a transforming sector, the cost efficiency objective may not 
be enough in face of the investment requirements; regulators may need to introduce new 
objectives such as integration of RES, enabling DSM and energy efficiency, as a means 
of achieving the EU Energy Policy targets. 
Some authors, e.g. (Lapillonne et all, 2012), believe that regulations to enable SG 
investments will be adapted from the current situation – some new players will emerge, 
but overall, the business models of TSOs and DSOs are likely to remain broadly similar 
to what they are today. An opposite view, that we are aligned with, is expressed in 
(Bauknecht, 2010) which argues that incentive regulation mechanism may not be 
sufficient to promote network integration of DG. For that, he gives three reasons: the 
first is that regulatory mechanisms to promote innovations need to be coordinated with 
innovation instruments outside regulation; second, the author questions if network 
regulation should be limited to economic incentives, or whether additional instruments 
should be applied by the regulator; and third, DG and network transformation as a new 
objective require not only adaptations on the level of regulatory instruments, but make it 
necessary to rethink the overall role and objectives of regulation. (Bauknecht, 2010) 
looks at the governance mechanisms of the standard model54 in the light of network 
transformation55 to depict what adjustment the standard model needs in order to cope 
                                                 
54
 Incentive regulation (as price-based instruments to correct market failures). 
55
 Network Transformation stresses the need for additional governance mechanisms. Proponents of the 
standard model reject the argument that system transformation represents a specific challenge. 
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with system transformation. Bauknecht uses integration of DG as a case of system 
transformation. We believe that SG also configures a situation of system transformation, 
as it involves several changes (besides DG, load such as EVs need to be integrated), and 
new roles in the electricity value chain. To follow Bauknecht’s steps, the standard 
model was designed to improve efficiency, rather than to provide a governance 
mechanism for structural transformation, and thus it can encounter problems when the 
focus shifts from short-term efficiency to more long-term issues like investment and 
innovation. The electricity system and the network in particular, represent an example 
of an interlinked system that is prone to lock in and path dependency, which means that 
it is difficult to change one element without changing others. This is important from the 
point of view of coordination as this infrastructure system includes the network 
companies, the organizational setup, and strategy and planning procedures. Given this, 
as Bauknecht says, network companies cannot easily adapt to new objectives and 
requirements, even if economic signals are changed via incentive formula.  
We shall now see how some EU regulators are handling change. UK and Italy 
regulation models have been pointed as examples in what concerns to providing the 
bases for the new regulation models that incentivize R&D and investment (Meeus and 
Saguan, 2011), (Müller, 2012). In the case of UK, RPI-X56 regulation was implemented 
in 1990 and it proved to make distribution companies succeed in achieving significant 
efficiency improvements and delivering gains to customers. The incentive regulation 
model of distribution networks in UK has been featuring a hybrid approach since 1990. 
Under the current arrangements, OPEX, CAPEX and quality of service are incentivized 
separately within the so-called “Building Blocks” approach. That is, the different cost 
components receive diverse regulatory treatment. Given this, the Ofgem (Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets) framework allows for a flexible regulatory treatment of 
CAPEX. In order to provide for a reasonable level of CAPEX, Ofgem introduced the 
“Menu of Sliding Scales” to individually assess the required level of CAPEX: according 
                                                 
56
 RPI-X regulation denominates the approach of price-cap regulation employed in the United Kingdom. 
The allowed tariffs (price-cap) are determined ex-ante by the regulator and are corrected for the rate of 
inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index (UK Retail Prices Index, RPI) and for expected 
efficiency savings x (x-factor). The x-factor is determined by benchmarking the network operators cost 
vis-à-vis its peers. The individual x-factor of a network operator reflects the efficiency potential to catch 
up with the best in class. The network operator receives a reward when he outperforms its efficiency 
target and a penalty in case of underperformance. This constitutes the heart of incentive regulation. The 
inherent logic of this regulatory approach has been adopted in many other countries worldwide. 
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to their investment strategy, network operators may choose between a regulatory menu 
of a rather cost-based driven regulation of their CAPEX or a rather incentive-based 
approach. Ofgem also implemented regulatory provision for innovation: this includes 
the introduction of an Innovation Fund Initiative (IFI) to recover R&D expenditures via 
regulated tariffs; moreover, the instrument Registered Power Zones (RPZ) involves the 
option to create tariff space for demonstration projects aiming at the connection of DG. 
The new regulatory framework, which became into effect this year (2013) is an outcome 
from Ofgem’s RPI-X@20 initiative57. It is known as RIIO (Revenues set to deliver 
strong Incentives, Innovation and Outputs), which can be synthesized as Revenues = 
Incentives + Innovation + Outputs, and it is based on the RPI-X framework. The main 
key features of RIIO model can be summarized as follows (Ofgem, 2010), (Ofgem, 
2013):  
Revenues and outputs: revenues are set upfront during the price control review 
process, and are the revenues a network operator is allowed to recover. There are six 
output categories: “Customer satisfaction”, “Reliability and availability”, “Safe network 
services”, “Connection terms”, “Environmental impact”, and “Social obligations”. In 
each category, a subset of “Primary outputs” is defined reflecting customer expectations 
with respect to the operational business of the network operator. Output delivery is 
encouraged by incentives directly linked to primary outputs and the allowed revenues. 
Innovation stimulus package: the regulatory framework includes a flexible instrument 
called “secondary deliverables” to provide for dynamic efficiency. This instrument 
gives network operators the opportunity to include expenses in their business plans 
related with innovative projects of which costs occur immediately but benefits only 
materialize within a longer time frame. To capture the horizon of dynamic efficiency, 
milestones in project delivery are defined. With regard to the price control, this implies 
that network operators will merely be allowed to raise revenues from consumers if a 
specific milestone is reached. This approach was chosen to provide certainty to network 
operators to engage in long term investments, and also that customers do not overpay 
                                                 
57
 RPI-X@20 is Ofgem’s detailed review of energy network regulation. Ofgem looked at how best to 
regulate energy network companies to enable them to meet the challenges and opportunities of delivering 
the networks required for a sustainable, low carbon energy sector (Ofgem, 2010). 
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and their money is only raised when there is a certainty that network operators will 
deliver benefits in the long run. 
Incentives – eight year regulatory period: the extension of the regulatory period to 
eight years intends to provide network operators with new flexibility to efficiently 
optimize their delivery of outputs in a longer perspective and to reduce regulatory risks. 
Business plan review as core instrument of the price control review process: under 
the RIIO model the onus would be on the network companies to determine how best to 
deliver outputs over time, reflecting on the results of their stakeholder engagement and 
subsquently developing well-justified business plans. 
 
In the case of Italy, tariff regulation is implemented through a price cap mechanism with 
efficiency goals for transmission, distribution, and metering services set by regulator 
over a 4-year regulatory period. The efficiency targets only apply to operating costs. 
The regulator updates the price cap on an annual basis that provides for two costs 
categories: first takes in account the reduction of operating costs, and second a review 
of depreciation and return on invested capital to adapt for new infrastructure 
investments to improve security of supply, competition, and quality of service. The 
regulator also discriminates between different categories for transmission and 
distribution investment which are associated with an extra rate of return for 12 years (in 
the case of transmission) and 8 or 12 years (in the case of distribution). The Italian 
regulator also introduced efficiency indicators to measure the extra benefit an individual 
investment brings to the system. In what concerns to SMs, Italy has the largest SM base 
in the world. This is due to Enel58  initiative to massively roll-out SMs. The SMs 
activities fall under network operator’s responsibility, and related tariffs are determined 
by the regulator and included OPEX and CAPEX with a SM specific WACC amounting 
to 7.2%. In parallel, the regulator also created instruments to promote innovation 
consisting of a general R&D component in the network tariffs. Demonstration projects 
are incentivized within a competitive procedure. Selected projects will be awarded with 
an increased WACC of 2% points for 12 years. 
                                                 
58
 Enel S.p.A. (Ente Nazionale per l'energia ELettrica) is an Italian electric utility company, that was 
formerly a state-owned monopoly, and it is now partially privatised with Italian government control. 
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(Müller, 2012) analyses the two regulatory environments in respect to factors related to 
dynamic innovation and concludes that UK example features the new regulatory 
awareness to undertake a long-term perspective with respect to regulatory incentives 
instead of focusing solely on short-term efficiency targets. The downside is a very 
intense regulatory scheme and a high level of regulatory scrutiny. Italy’s approach 
implies a less holistic but rather straightforward solution to promote technological 
progress where the regulator may increase the rate of return for specific investments and 
investigates their efficiency. This may involve demarcation problems and technology 
preferences given by the regulator. 
It is clear that European predominant regulatory model of revenue- or price-caps, is 
challenged in its fundamental assumptions. However, we have just observed that some 
countries are trying a new path beyond the Standard Incentive Regulation. 
3.4 Interoperability 
We have mentioned in section 3.1, that one important outcome of the first mandate of 
the SGTF was the standards framed by the three Standardization Mandates (M/441 
Smart Meters, M/468 Electrical Vehicles, and M/490 Smart Grids) (see Figure 5). As 
we have seen, standards are considered key to progress with SG because they are a 
guarantee of interoperability. However, the question remains: In a liberalized economy, 
shall we impose standards, or on the other hand, let the market decide on the standards 
(de facto standards)? Other important question is what the role of standards is in the 
global SG governance. 
(Brunsson et all, 2012) provide a literature review on standards dynamics that includes 
its definition and classification. One distinction has been made between technical and 
non-technical standards. Technical standards, also known as “compatibility” or 
“interface” standards are defined as “codified specifications about components and their 
relational attributes”. Non-technical standards are encountered in a variety of different 
domains, such as quality control, social and environmental management, financial and 
non-financial reporting and securities regulation. The authors also elaborate on the 
distinction between de jure and de facto standards. De jure standards are the product of 
a deliberately steered process of decision-making. Committees are often regarded as the 
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organizational entities responsible for deciding on de jure standards (e.g. as in the case 
of ISO standards59). While some authors argue that standardization that is committee-
based rather than market-based is more likely to achieve coordination, largely because it 
avoids incompatibility, other studies have shown that the internal politics of the 
committees, which are often closely linked to vested interests, can undercut the 
legitimacy of standards and slow down their development. By contrast, the concept of 
de facto standards refers to processes that lead to uniformity, in the sense that all or near 
all potential adopters eventually come to adopt the same solution and turn it into a 
model that is difficult to deviate from.  
 
Figure 6 - Relationship between international and European standard bodies 
Source: CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group (SGCG) 
It is important to note that ICT standards have an important difference from the 
traditional industrial economy product standards and Standard Development 
Organizations (SDOs), which is the magnitude of the externalities, or network effects, 
created by the need for interoperability of different ICT systems and products, and the 
problem of high switching costs, or “lock-in” (this is particularly important for example 
in the case of SGs and SMs, where massive rollouts need to be done); actually, some 
authors refer the non-existence of standards as a risk factor for the non-deployment of 
SMs (e.g.: (GEODE, 2013)). (Brunsson et all, 2012) show that beyond institutional 
reasons, functionalist arguments support the idea that standards are adopted for 
economic reasons or to improve efficiency: adopters often comply with a standard 
                                                 
59
 In the context of standardization, ISO stands for International Organization for Standardization, which 
is an international standard-setting body composed of representatives from various national standards 
organizations. 
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because it is linked with positive network externalities; other scholars have argued that 
the adoption of standards is positively associated with higher levels of operational 
performance. Moreover, standards are an important means of organizing markets. 
Standards contribute to the organization of markets by promoting compatibility and 
harmonization among the otherwise incongruous components of a system: they align the 
interests of, and enhance communication among, a variety of market actors. 
Being the EU and the USA main competitors to set global standards, each one has 
different local regulatory cultures: while the US is seen as a LME (Liberal Market 
Economy) where informal standard development processes are perceived as legitimate, 
the EU is perceived as a CME (Coordinated Market Economy) where formal standard 
developing processes take place (Winn, 2009). The author presents informal private 
SDOs known as “consortia” or “fora” which have emerged in recent decades. The 
author sees such organizations as a reaction to the rapid pace of innovation in ICT 
markets and the large economic stakes created when strong network effects are present60. 
(Baisheng, 2012), on the other hand, sees the appearance of such SDOs as a reaction to 
the fact that in some formal SDOs, the outcome of standards competition is decided as 
the vote of each country; given this, in the formal Standards Organizations, the EU is in 
big advantage relative to the US. SDOs in the United States operate largely outside any 
form of government oversight and focus intensively on market conditions, while SDOs 
in more highly regulated countries (such as France, Germany and Japan) operate within 
a framework of government oversight and focus on regulatory as well as market 
variables. If now we want to think of standards as widely implemented (by different 
countries), although it seems to be an impractical idea, it is important to note that the 
basic outlines of a framework to achieve such goal may already exist in the Code of 
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards contained in 
Annex 3 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement)61. 
                                                 
60
 While traditional product standards may be soft law if voluntary, or hard law if made mandatory by 
incorporation into or reference from legislation, when the adoption of ICT standards is driven by strong 
network effects, the regulatory effect of those standards may exceed that of even hard law. 
61
 During the decades after the World War II, of big economic growth and increased trade, the role of 
technical standards in cross-border trade has increased. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), established in 1947, and the WTO, established in 1995, has contributed to an enormous 
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In the non-US developed countries with a tradition of developing their own national 
standards, a single dominant National Standards Body (NSB) normally handles the 
work of standards developing. NSBs may be organized as private sector organizations 
or government agencies. At the international level, the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an agency of the United Nations, are 
recognized as de jure international standard organizations. Countries designate the 
standard developing body that will represent them in these international bodies. NSBs 
established as government agencies generally work closely with other government 
agencies in charge of developing and executing national economic development 
strategies. In Europe, the work of NSBs is subject to EU law, and is coordinated with 
the work of European Standards Organizations (ESO) including the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). The ESOs have made a formal commitment to cooperate with ISO and 
IEC; this commitment forms part of a framework of coordination of standard setting 
that integrates the work of European NSBs, ESOs and international SDOs. This 
relationship is depicted in Figure 6. 
The challenge currently facing ICT SDOs based in Europe is that, under conditions of 
trade liberalization, products can be sold directly to European producers and consumers 
that incorporate consortia-based standards, resulting in ad hoc recognition of de facto 
standards before de jure standards can be completed. Under conditions of trade 
liberalization it would be difficult as a practical matter and politically controversial for 
EU regulators to block access in local markets to products based on consortia standards. 
                                                                                                                                               
reduction to explicit barriers to international trade in the form of quotas and tariffs. As explicit barriers 
have dropped, however, the significance of implicit barriers in the form of incompatible national 
standards has grown enormously. Under the GATT issues related to standards and trade have been 
addressed by voluntary GATT Standards Code. By the time WTO was established, obligations governing 
technical standards changed from voluntary to mandatory under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement). As for (Brunsson et all, 2012), standards are particularly important in the 
context of international regulation; because most state legislation remains bound to a national territory, 
standards are often the only type of rule that can be applied internationally. Standards have emerged 
particularly in those areas where intergovernmental regulation is weak or non-existent but there are 
significant global governance challenges. The high demand for international standards is a response to the 
view that divergent national standards are often seen as counterproductive and as an obstacle to global 
economic integration. 
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(Brunsson et all, 2012) note that there is a tension that arises from the conflict between 
the freedom to set standards and their potential regulatory impact: because standards are 
voluntary, in principle, everybody is free to set new standards; however, the existence of 
multiple equivalent or very closely related standards often undermines their regulatory 
effect. This is the most obvious in the case of compatibility standards, which aim to 
improve coordination between different parties. This is an important aspect for SG as 
SG will bring a global market either for electric and ICT hardware and software. 
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Chapter 4  
Way Forward: are Smart Grids really feasible? 
In this chapter, we take the previous sections and will think of which factors are most 
important to provide the development of the Smart Grid, and will point possible 
directions to timely achieve the EU energy policy goals.  
In order to make the SG feasible, there are some barriers that shall be overcome, namely 
the consumer’s acceptance, providing R&D incentives, incentives for investment, a 
proper market design, standardized interfaces promoting interoperability, and proper 
grid tariffs. We also make an approach based on Institutional Economics, in particular 
in the role of EU institutions and regulators (either at MS and EU level). Of course we 
don’t neglect the importance of the market mechanisms, but we believe institutions will 
play a central role in SG implementation.  
The dominant idea around the SG is that it will bring many benefits, both for consumers 
and utilities, and it is going to revolutionize the electric industry in the next coming 
years. As noted by (Ernest & Young, 2012), there are many challenges to make the SG. 
There are concerns amongst the key stakeholders about the ability of current or 
proposed mechanisms to deal with these complexities and expectations. For example, 
according to that report, the adoption of SG is likely to be slow, with little investment 
before 2023. We think that having an opposite opinion would enrich the discussion, and 
that is the case of (Makovich, 2011) who advises that SG is not the disruptive 
technology that will bring us all the advantages claimed by its advocates. Instead, in his 
view, changes in the power sector will continue but will be incremental because the 
technology is still evolving and because consumers do not want the more flexible and 
uncertain pricing schemes that would replace the predictable and stable pricing of 
today’s system.  
Whatever the time frame is, the huge investments required by SG, in the European 
context, may have to be raised through regulated tariffs, subsidies from national or 
regional taxes or by government-backed bank financing. These investments will not 
pass unseen by final consumers. Thus, it is of major importance to find regulatory 
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models enabling these large and urgent investments while credibly assuring tariff-
payers that the cost increases do not represent higher rent-taking from the firms and 
operators in the supply chain. 
4.1 Consumers 
In order to promote consumer acceptance of SG and SM technology, users should be 
better informed of the advantages those technologies bring to them so that they become 
involved. It may be benefic that MSs retain the right to choose the market model that 
brings the most benefits to their region and the customers, based on historical traditions, 
technical development and current market structure, keeping costs of changes as low as 
possible (GEODE, 2013). 
Although users have not been actively involved in other grid innovations, they will 
likely play a pivotal role in the future of SGs. DSM, SMs, and appliances intervene 
directly in the daily routines and practices of consumers. There are many pilots for SG 
ongoing in Europe and in other parts of the world, although the focus of many pilots has 
been predominantly on technical learning. Increasingly the various SG concepts are 
being confronted with social reality. A pivotal part of user involvement is the way they 
interact with the systems. The assumption that households are willing to change their 
behavior in order to enable an efficient and effective grid management has not been 
proved yet. Besides the limited flexibility in demand, the openness of consumers to 
changes in behavior is also not clear because of issues such as privacy. Pilots on SG 
should be able to allow actors to learn at an early stage from the experience and 
attitudes of consumers.  
(Verbong et all, 2013) tries to understand which visions on user perspectives in current 
and future SG experiments do stakeholders propagate, taking ongoing SG projects in 
Netherlands as study analysis. In this study the author interviews several stakeholders 
(curiously consumers are not interviewed because representatives didn’t want to 
participate). The main conclusions from this work are that although consumers became 
more central in SG projects, the focus is still mainly on technical issues and economic 
incentives, and from this perspective consumers are often regarded as a potential barrier 
to SGs deployment, and financial incentives are still seen as the best instrument to 
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persuade or seduce them. Barriers include the domain of privacy, the degree of control, 
lack of interest or time, and the difficulty to change routine behavior. The proposed 
solutions to better understand how to involve consumers, suggest looking at the services 
the energy system delivers, and not at technological options to improve this system. The 
pilots and demonstration projects offer an excellent opportunity for such exploration. As 
threats for this understanding, the author points the possibility that the focus remains too 
much on technology and on the protection of vested interests. Given this, further 
reflection on the question of to what extent users should act as solution to a low carbon 
economy, stands up. 
4.2 System organization/Market design 
The roles of the current actors in the electricity value chain will change as the vertical 
interfaces between regulated and unregulated tasks become blurred. However, not 
having vertical separation could distort competition by not only distorting access to 
information and infrastructure, but potentially also cross-subsidizing competitive 
business of monopoly operations. Moreover, the vertical separation of the energy sector 
in Europe is instrumental to the implementation of modern incentive-based regulation 
(Agrell et all, 2013). 
As we have seen, the Third Package contains measures to ensure a more effective 
unbundling of transmission networks. However, distribution networks are still only 
subject to legal unbundling; this includes unbundling of accounts, operations and 
information. For unbundling in Distribution networks, a trade-off between competition 
and coordination may also be needed. (Friedrichsen, 2011) proposes an independent 
system operator (ISO) as a compromise solution for this coordination. The author raises 
the discussion to strengthen the rules for distribution networks, as recent developments 
with respect to SGs and the immense development of DG make the unbundling question 
increasingly interesting because of discrimination concerns and coordination needs. In 
this paper, the author analyses possible organizations for Distribution, which are Full 
Ownership Unbundling, Independent Distribution Operation and Independent System 
Operation. The conclusion is that the best solution for the Distribution case is to have an 
Independent System Operation (ISO). The arguments are that the ISO is not “suspect” 
to discrimination incentives but would still enable wide coordination. In SG the most 
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relevant point where coordination is indispensable is system operation because it 
requires certain central control to satisfy the need for real time coordinated actions in 
balancing. Furthermore, even with advanced market coordination, a system operator is 
needed to realize dispatch decisions that come out of the market mechanisms. However, 
such central controller is naturally endowed with enormous power that is linked to the 
ability to discriminate; therefore the central system operator needs to be neutral. In 
contrast to system operation, coordination of system development doesn’t need to 
happen in real time. The considerations made for Full Ownership Unbundling are that 
the price mechanism is not sufficient to address all coordination needs in SG. 
Notwithstanding the potential for decentralized coordination and self-organization, 
increases in SGs with advanced information, communication and automation 
technology. Legal Unbundling in SG may not guarantee the neutrality of the network 
operator if it still has affiliated retail and/or generation activities – the high number and 
small size of the actors and transactions make it extremely difficult to prove neutrality 
in the choice of control actions. Thus, an ISO allows centralized coordination while 
ensuring non-discrimination for all actors. The ISO model allows network owners to 
engage in the generation business. Furthermore, system operation can be combined with 
the information function in SGs. However, the author leaves the governance of the ISO 
for future research. Another suggestion is that the information structure component of 
SG is operated independently with regulated, non-discriminatory access to information 
to prevent competitive distortions. Since the neutrality of the information is a key 
requirement for system operation, the idea is to combine both functions and give the 
information function to an independent DSO. 
4.3 Incentives for investments 
We have been noticing that the European predominant regulatory model for revenue or 
price-caps is challenged in its fundamental assumptions, as current regulation is 
inadequate in the sense that (i) absolute cost containment is infeasible (since costs will 
increase), (ii) the standard revenue-drivers (e.g. energy transported) will generate lower 
income to the operators (intrinsic in the energy efficiency component of the SG), and 
(iii) that explicit incentives are weak or ineffective for activities such as SG 
development and coordination. 
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Thus, a special treatment is needed in what concerns investments. We have seen that 
some solutions are already in place, such as increase in the regulatory period, better 
remuneration (cost of capital) for diverse SG related projects, and more frequent 
updates of the price cap (allowed tariffs). This means that the regulator shall be 
sensitive to a progressive implementation of SG, and for that, negotiation needs to be 
done deeply, and the regulatory process needs to call for more flexibility. Of course we 
shall take as important the fact that the regulated company still needs to focus on cost 
efficiency. 
In our opinion, the UK and Italy cases can be seen as important reference examples for 
investment incentives. However, the costs of regulation shall be taken in account, as 
they imply a bigger involvement and control of DSO activities. 
4.4 Incentives for R&D 
R&D activities are key not only to develop innovative products and services, but also 
for the sake of testing new solutions. This is particularly important in the case of SGs 
where uncertainty and risk are two key factors for the coming massive investments. It 
helps to evaluate and test the benefits of innovative intelligent technology, estimate 
costs, learn about customer behavior and barriers to overcome in possible further 
deployments. 
Besides regulation incentives (mainly for DSOs), funding programmes at MS and 
European level are still needed. Publicly funding R&D projects shall be able to bring 
benefits to society and increase the level of knowledge and expertise within the industry 
as a whole as well as of all actors in the value chain. 
4.5 Grids tariffs 
As we have seen, building a SG requires several network investments, mainly from 
DSOs. In this scenario, regulators shall allow DSOs to make the required revenue 
through network tariffs so that network costs and investments are covered. At the same 
time, tariffs shall also be able to create incentives in user behavior. 
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Figure 7- Network Pricing Steps 
Adapted from (EURELECTRIC, 2013) 
According to (EURELECTRIC, 2013) network pricing comprises three major steps (see 
Figure 7 for reference). Allowed revenues affect DSO investment behavior as they have 
an impact on the recovery of network costs. Network tariffs are part of the electricity 
tariffs paid by customers and thus also affect customer behavior. 
In Europe, depending on the countries, the legislation and the regulatory framework 
differ as regards determining allowed revenues as well as network tariffs. There are two 
main approaches to network tariff setting: in one approach, the NRA sets the limit on 
the allowed revenue for each regulatory period and outlines the methodology/guidelines 
for setting network tariffs – DSO determines network charges according to the defined 
methodology and how this total amount is divided between connection charges and the 
single tariffs; in the other approach the regulator has more control and sets both the 
level of connection charges as well as the level and structure of individual tariffs for a 
given period of time. 
In designing the network tariff structure, the architectural elements present in Table 3 
are the ones usually taken in account. Connection charges are described in Figure 7. As 
for the other network charges, i.e., Use-of-System charges (UoS), network users are 
required to help recovering the recurring operating and capital expenses incurred in 
network operation and investment; Commercial Services Charges are related with 
administrative costs for providing services to consumers such as billing, meter reading, 
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and customer support that are independent of network operations; finally, Energy Policy 
Charges are used to cover network related costs that are policy driven (cross-
subsidization of low income or rural communities, stranded costs of restructuring, feed-
in tariffs for renewables, etc). 
Element Purpose Design Choices Variations 
Connection 
Charge 
to recover the initial, non-
recurring connection costs for  
enabling the user to receive  
network services 
- shallow  
- deep  
- average 
may be levied  
- up front 
- in limited installments 
- periodically 
Use-of-System 
Charge 
to recover the recurring operating 
and capital costs for network 
maintenance and expansion 
- reference network model 
- postage stamp 
- megawatt mile 
- contract path 
- decoupling 
- gross- or net-metering 
may be differentiated by 
- capacity demand (MW) 
- consumption (MWh) 
- time of day 
- season 
- average per connection 
Commercial 
Services Charge 
to recover the cost of services  
such as billing, customer  
support, etc 
- average 
- transaction fees 
- minimum fee 
- maximum fee 
Energy Policy 
Charge 
to recover the cost of policy 
outcomes such 
cross-subsidization of low 
income or rural communities, 
stranded costs of restructuring, 
feed-in tariffs for renewables, etc 
- average fee 
- lump sums 
 
- increasing over time 
- decreasing over time 
Table 3 - Architectural elements for network tariffs 
Source: (Sakhrani and Parsons, 2011) 
Figure 8 summarizes several aspects from tariffs. As generation and network business 
are not a vertically integrated business, the cost of energy can be separated from 
network related cost of delivery. This separation results in two types of tariffs, Network 
or access tariffs (network related capital and operating costs) and Integral tariffs (cost of 
energy and network related capital and operating costs). This figure also spots the 
regulatory drivers that influence the decisions of network owners; the main high level 
principles that affect tariff design, directly or indirectly, are Universal Access, Quality 
of Service, Capacity Adequacy, and Energy Policy. 
  
Figure 8 - Cost C
(EURELECTRIC, 2013) elaborates on the development of network pricing pointing the 
new challenges for DSOs, pricing for DR and proposing network tariffs 
incentives. During periods of relatively low energy consumption, a number of 
households with DER could be self
consume. They would then deliver their production surplus to the grid. In systems wit
a high penetration of DG, the network usage time for ordinary consumption of 
electricity delivered from the network may decrease. Power would become an even 
more important cost driver as DG does not reduce overall network costs. When there is 
no production from DG, the network still needs to be designed to cover peak demand 
situations (EVs will usually even increase the maximum load in the network)
volumetric network tariffs
consumption. Demand reduction resulting from DG in particular will require spreading 
the cost of grid investments and renewable subsidies over a smaller customer base. On 
the one hand, customers could be incentivized to reduce their overall consumption via 
energy efficiency measures. On the other hand, network costs incurred by consumers 
with DER would be shifted towards customers who do not have those at their disposal.
Although volumetric tariffs send s
reflect the costs that arise from peak hours. DR can be a way to tap into the potential of 
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 In combination with energy efficiency applied to residential, commercial and industrial load, the 
overall energy volume transported per customer is expected to decrea
expansion of total power for household and commercial appliances, the peak load is likely not decreasing, 
or at least less than the total energy consumption 
63
 In a survey that (EURELECTRIC, 2013) conducted,
at least partially volumetric, i.e. based on energy (
customers are almost entirely recovered from volumetric tariffs in most countries. In 62.5% of the 
countries some form of time
summer/winter). 
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ategories and Regulatory Drivers influencing Tariff Types
(Adapted from (Sakhrani and Parsons, 2011)) 
-sufficient or even produce more energy than they 
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, the KWh charge might need to rise to offset the loss of 
igns to reduce the consumption of energy, they don’t 
         
se. However, with continued 
(Agrell et all, 2013) 
 in all the participant countries, network tariffs are 
€/kWh). Network costs induced by household 
-of-use network tariff options exist (e.g. peak/off-peak, day/night, seasonal: 
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energy efficient use of infrastructure by reducing demand at peak time (peak shaving), 
shifting demand between times of day or seasons (load shifting) or increasing demand at 
night hours (valley filing). 
Today the relevant signals for DR are often missing: neither the regulated prices nor 
largely volumetric network tariffs incentivize retail customers to reduce peak 
consumption (network tariffs are calculated on the basis of the contribution of each 
customer group to peak demand). To make DR work, customers should be provided 
with options that allow them to actively participate in the energy system. They should 
be incentivized to shift their consumption so that the use of their electric appliances is 
more equally distributed throughout the day. New tariff options should incentivize 
customers to change their consumption behavior to shave peak load in order to ensure 
lower average network costs and energy bills. A new tariff structure should represent 
the different nature of fixed costs and of variable costs. Cost-reflective network 
charging could be achieved by more capacity based network tariffs such as two-part 
network tariffs with a power/capacity and an energy component or network tariffs that 
penalize energy use at peak hours.  
Thus, by considering these observations, DR has an important impact on tariff design. 
However, there are other aspects important to consider, namely how is CAPEX going to 
be included in the tariffs; as SG entails huge investments, a raise in the tariffs is 
predicted. As we spotted before, this raise shall be perceived by consumers as a needed 
increase, and not as an increase of utility’s rents. Thus, regulators are responsible to 
assure the inclusion of SG investment costs in the tariffs is done in a fair and rational 
way, and that the costs of some elements of current tariffs is redefined for current reality, 
or even eliminated (for example subsidization of renewable technologies). 
4.6 Standardization strategies 
Although standardization may not look an important aspect of the economy of SGs, we 
want to spot some important implications of standards. Because SG requires a systemic 
approach, standards for data format, information handling, and transfer protocols are an 
important requirement to assure easy and system wide exchange. In communication 
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(European Commission, 2011a), the EC recognizes the importance of standards and 
pushes for their development and implementation. 
What is recommended are minimum common functionalities in all future SMs. When 
deciding on new requirements for SMs functionality, they should not apply 
retrospectively. Decision making bodies should take into account that changing 
standards and regulation regarding meter functionalities for already installed SMs will 
carry a significant cost which will ultimately be borne by the consumer. 
The North American NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) adopted a 
strategy which increases its influence at the international level. NIST chose to rely on 
the largest possible extent on international standards. NIST SG working group was 
conceived as a form whose decisions rules had to be designed to decrease the costs 
borne by US firms to consolidate their technological leadership. Moreover, although 
NIST is an American institution, it strategically opened membership to other countries 
keeping the majority of the votes for American companies. This move enables USA to 
lead the technical standards having the support of other countries. Another important 
fact is that, according to (Bellantuono, 2012), in NIST, SG utilities only represent 10% 
of the membership, while vendor and vendor-related categories represent 50%; this 
means that the approval of standards can be done without the agreement of utilities and 
regulators. In our view this is a weakness that may affect the adoption of standards. 
Nevertheless, both USA and EU are trying to drive the international debate and export 
their standards and their regulatory models (USA with the model of consortia SDOs, 
and inviting other countries for their national SDOs - where NIST SG is an example, 
and the EU by redesigning the EU SDOs procedures). 
4.7 The importance of EU Institutions in a transforming sector 
We have seen from previous chapters that the EU objectives are very ambitious and 
there is already much work about the development of a SG. It is important to note that 
most of the documents regarding EU energy policy are only communications that have 
no legal binding effect on the MSs. This is because, according to the TFEU64, the EU 
                                                 
64
 Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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can only regulate specific fields of the energy policy. In (Knödler, 2012), studies across 
EU countries show that none of the national energy policies lay down a clear time table 
and finance plan for establishing a SG, pointing as exception Hungary which has a clear 
strategy with a precise timetable on how and when to roll-out SMs and SGs, which both 
shall occur in 2014. In opposite, USA and China have been devoting substantial 
resources in their territories to the development of SGs. 
Nevertheless, we can surely state that, because SGs ease the efficient integration of DG 
and RES, they have a substantial political and financial support in the EU.  As a matter 
of fact, and as we summarized in section 3.1, the EU released several directives in that 
direction: Renewable Directive (2009/28/EC), Internal Market Directive (2009/72/EC), 
and Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (2006/32/EC), which 
are supportive of intelligent networks or intelligent metering. Financial support is given 
in the context of Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7) for R&D in SGs, ICT, and Green Cars & Electromobility 65 . 
However, we have seen that reaching consensus and meeting the deadlines of 
regulations and their implementation is sometimes an headache for EU as a single entity. 
The institutions of the EU should be given more discretion. Binding EU regulation or 
directives should be created so that implementation of EU wide SG is feasible. It should 
be clear who is charged and who supervises the SM and SG deployment on a national 
and European level. This would remove, or at least reduce the existent holdup on these 
investments. 
In Europe, despite of the legislative packages adopted by MSs and transposed to 
national law by NRAs, there is a variety of regulation methods being applied (one 
directive, several methods). We see this as advantages and disadvantages. The obvious 
advantage is that NRA has better knowledge of its country culture, habits and social 
dynamics. The disadvantage is that it may difficult the coordination and harmonization 
of EU policies. We witnessed this problem in the Third Package where achieving 
consensus over unbundling was a difficult process. This is also a reason for the non-
                                                 
65
 FP7 runs from 2007 to 2013 (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/energy/home_en.html, last visited August 8, 
2013 ), and a new framework for R&D from 2014 to 2020, Horizon 2020 (The EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation), is already being elaborated 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020, last visited August 8, 2013 ). 
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bindingness of some EU regulations. We could think that if SG becomes a political 
objective of EU Energy Policy that could help to ease the adherence of some MSs to the 
existent regulations, but given the considerations done, that may prove difficult. 
Furthermore, in a time where the project of the European Union itself is being 
questioned. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions 
In this dissertation, we intended to give an answer to our Research Questions which 
were the following: 
1. “Will Smart Grid be able to give an answer to main today’s questions such as 
energy security, energy cost and environment impact? 
2. What is the role of economic regulation in providing the incentives to invest in 
Smart Grid? 
 We also used the sub-questions as guidelines for our reasearch: 
1. Is the European regulation designed so that it promotes the implementation of 
Smart Grids (directives, financial funds, support)? 
2. What is the rule of standards on the choices of Smart Grid technologies, and 
how does the global governance of standards can influence those choices (taking in 
account that interoperability is important in network industries)? 
 
During this work, we had the opportunity to see that, in what concerns to Energy Policy, 
the European Union has as driving forces the environment concerns, the rising cost of 
energy, and geopolitical issues which have an important impact on European energy 
security. These are the main motivations to build a European Smart Grid. 
Having monopoly been a way of organizing the electric sector in several European 
countries, and public enterprise the way of regulating it, moving to a liberalized market 
resulted in applying regulation mechanisms that have the roots on the work of 
Littlechild in the United Kingdom (and which emanated from there to many other 
countries). This regulation gives emphasis to operational efficiency of the network 
operators. 
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The “idea of Europe”, in particular of the European Union, has in its architecture the 
construction of an internal market and its liberalization; this vision was consubstantiated 
by the production of legislation at European level that resulted in a new landscape of the 
market and regulation of the electricity sector. Currently, there are areas of the 
electricity value chain that are liberalized (generation and supply), having the 
monopolist structure been preserved for transmission and distribution. During the 
decades in which distribution and transmission have been regulated, the dominant idea 
has been that the main objective of regulation should be to assure the operational 
efficiency of those companies. This objective has been, we can say, successfully 
achieved; however, in what concerns to innovation, the regulation mechanisms didn’t 
have the same success in its promotion to the regulated companies. As a consequence, 
we observe that in some European countries, the age of networks is a problem due to 
lack of innovation and inadequate investment incentives. Nevertheless, the present 
panorama requests the same networks to answer the problems raised by the increasing 
energy cost, an increasing pressure from environment issues, and to answer the question 
of energy security. For that it is necessary to promote investment so that electric 
networks are updated. There are two ways to do it: one is keeping with the traditional 
network expansion strategies (laying more transmission lines, etc), and the other is the 
construction of Smart Grids. 
We have seen that from the economic point of view, Smart Grids are more attractive, 
but their implementation is seen as a complex process, mainly from the organizational 
point of view. We also noted that Smart Grids are advantageous in what concerns RES 
integration and also in what concerns the management of their intermittency. Another 
point that answers to part of the energy costs is the transformation of the demand/supply 
paradigm in which Smart Grid promises that demand can follow supply (in opposition 
of current paradigm where what is intended is that generation follows the logic of 
satisfying demand). We can say that regulations produced by the European Union have 
thrown the basis in which Smart Grid can sit. We have seen that the diverse directives 
try to organize the market in a way that energetic efficiency, renewables, and essential 
infrastructures (both electric and communications), essential for Smart Grid 
development, are encouraged. However, it seems to us that main obstacles to the 
progression of Smart Grid may be the non-binding character of European regulations, 
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and the difficulties in reaching consensus in some important points at European level (as 
we have seen for the case of the Third Package). Besides that, finding the proper 
regulation incentives has been last years’ grail quest of Smart Grid regulation. 
So, we think that a way forward to a feasible SG involves a complex web of actors and 
concepts that need to be coordinated. This coordination should be directed by 
Regulators of the MSs guided by the experience of EU Institutions and based on the 
lessons learnt with SG pilots that happened and are still ongoing. We also agree on the 
importance of bringing the consumer to the center of the Smart Grid as without his 
engagement, DR cannot bring the expected results; besides that, it is essential to clarify 
that Smart Grid will not push their electricity bills down, but it can avoid that electricity 
bills grow as it would if the traditional way of network expansion continues. Regulators 
need to create the right conditions so that DSOs (and even DG companies) feel 
incentivized to invest. As we have seen, this can be made by improving the regulation 
schemes to increase CAPEX. In what concerns DG, an important point was raised in 
this dissertation, which is the potential that DSOs have to discriminate when it comes to 
connect DG; this point should also become subject of EU regulation as TSO unbundling 
was. Smart Meters are essential for Demand Response implementation. Being Smart 
Meters focused on the benefits for energy suppliers, and Smart Grids for network 
operators, it is important to know how DR impacts each of them. While energy 
suppliers will encourage consumers to smooth consumption via price signals, network 
operators are more concerned about reducing consumption peaks. So this raises some 
interesting (unanswered) questions, such as who shall have the control of DR – the 
suppliers or DSOs? Which signals shall be given to consumers? Shall network signals 
come via time of use tariffs or other mechanisms such as differential connection 
charges? Another apparently unrelated question is who will have the control of the user 
related information along the value chain? This information is needed both for suppliers 
and also for network operation (e.g. balance the intermittency of renewable DG). These 
rules shall obey EU regulations in what concerns privacy of information. 
Network externalities are a very important feature of network industries. Besides 
interoperability along the electricity value chain, SG also wants to bring services to the 
electric network; for that, it is essential that service providers adhere to interoperable 
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technologies, making the electric grid a platform where customer can connect their 
appliances in a vendor independent way. Furthermore, DSOs shall be able to integrate 
interoperable communication devices in their networks, reducing that way their 
dependency on proprietary solutions. The way to make it possible is by means of 
standardization. The European Union has made considerable efforts by creating several 
mandates where SM and SG standards were developed. However, competition for 
standards is aggressively taking place on the other side of the Atlantic. In order to gain 
advantage on the global arena, the European Union should position itself as a candidate 
for global standards leadership so that European companies can reap the benefits of 
technological investments and innovation. 
Following these considerations would result in bigger involvement of the regulator, 
which means that the regulation costs would be higher. However, that may compensate 
the social costs of not building a SG. Given this, changing the regulatory mindset is 
important; the regulatory process needs to be aligned with consumer protection (there 
should be sufficient investment to protect consumers from potential materially adverse 
outcomes). In the vein of (Ernest & Young, 2012), given the level of uncertainty, the 
concern is that trying to find the optimal solution may unnecessarily delay the 
development of Smart Grid. Thus, the rule of regulator is crucial in pushing forward the 
transformation of the grid.  
Ultimately, the costs of building a Smart Grid will be borne by consumers. Thus, tariff 
design is a critical tool to achieve revenues for these transformations. This is also a 
good opportunity to redeploy existent charges and evaluate how cost-reflective current 
tariffs are. 
A final word shall be written about the current European crisis and Smart Grid. 
Nowadays the European Union project is constantly being questioned, as are its 
institutions. The global competition has been putting at proof even the stronger 
economies. We believe that the security of supply and the raising costs of energy are 
very strong arguments to build a more efficient and cost effective grid as current society 
strongly relies on electricity. This is also the time for the EU institutions are given 
credibility and legitimacy in the case we all decide to move with the European project 
forward. This crisis is also teaching us that the European (and even the World) economy 
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is deeply intertwined, and economic blocks such as the USA and China are taking the 
lead in many crucial economic sectors. It would be desirable that EU could (re)organize 
itself so that their institutions could proceed with their aims.  
In what concerns to Smart Grid, and now coming back to our research questions, we 
think that EU has provided the needed foundations to develop the Smart Grid. However, 
it seems to us that although the Member States borders are open, sometimes they 
reappear in Brussels institutions, which can hamper some important decisions. Beyond 
that, corporate power is also something we cannot deny, and that is a transnational 
phenomenon that political power needs to tackle. Finally, not building the Smart Grid 
may result in a negative outlook for energy security, energy cost and environment 
impact.  
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Appendix I 
Stakeholder Main Smart Grids system needs and roles 
Consumers  
 
Consumption of energy products and services. This 
is the end-user of electricity. Categories of 
consumers are residentials, households, and 
communities. As consumers we also consider 
SMEs, industries and electricity-intensive 
industries. A specific example of a consumer 
category is the set of users with specialized 
mobility requirements for hybrid or pure electric 
vehicles. These users need mobility interface . 
Prosumers  
 
Consumers with the additional role of self-
provided (owned) electricity generation and/or 
storage for private, daily life needs, comfort and 
SME business needs.  
Energy Retailers  
 
Selling energy and other (related) services and 
products to consumers. Retailers will develop 
consumer oriented programmes and offerings.  
Aggregators  
 
Broking energy on behalf of a group or groups of 
prosumers  
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs)  
 
Provision of a broad range of comprehensive 
energy solutions, including designs and 
implementation of energy savings projects, energy 
conservation, energy infrastructure outsourcing, 
power generation and energy supply and risk 
management.  
Electric Appliance users  
 
The use of electrical appliances at consumer sites 
for daily life and business needs will increase due 
to substitution of (fossil based) space heating 
requirements. The users will be required to 
interface their needs with quality and security of 
supply needs of the electricity system.  
Electric Vehicle users  
 
A hybrid or pure electric vehicle is a specialized 
electricity consumer with mobility requirements. 
The users will be required to interface mobility 
needs with quality and security of supply needs of 
the electricity system.  
Generators  
 
Large scale centralized generation including wind 
farms.  
Distributed Generators  
 
Small- and medium-scale generation of mainly 
renewable based electricity either for third party 
consumers or for own consumption.  
Storage Providers  
 
Delivery of storage products and services, 
including their maintenance and operation thereby 
shifting electricity and energy consumption in time 
either for third parties or own purposes. 
Ancillary Service Providers  
 
Provision of services such as Power Balancing, 
Voltage Profile Support, Frequency and Time and 
Blackstart  
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ICT equipment and systems providers  
 
Sales of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT System) products and services.  
 
Telecommunications providers  
 
Provision of telecommunication services, based on 
dedicated or public infrastructure  
Data processing service providers  
 
Provision of data processing services respecting 
consumer privacy  
Energy Equipment & Systems Manufacturers  
 
Sales of Electro-technology (System) products and 
services.  
Distribution System Operators (DSOs)  
 
Provision of services for secure, efficient and 
sustainable operation of electricity distribution 
systems. Legal obligation of a high quality, secure 
planning, operation and maintenance of the 
distribution grid.  
Transmission System Operators (TSOs)  
 
Provision of services for a secure, efficient and 
sustainable operation of transmission system. Legal 
obligation of a high quality, secure planning, 
operation and maintenance of the transmission 
grid.  
Wholesale Electricity Market Traders  
 
Provision of market based prices for products and 
services by liquid electricity markets.  
Policy makers, Regulators  
 
Setup and control of natural monopoly 
requirements and for highly effective electricity 
markets.  
Electricity Market Operators  
 
Operators of market places for energy and other 
energy products and services  
  
Table 4 - Smart Grid stakeholders 
Source: (European SmartGrids, 2012) 
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